Journal of Applied Mathematics

Games under Ambiguous Payoffs and Optimistic Attitudes

Wei Xiong

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Abstract

In real-life games, the consequence or payoff of a strategy profile and a player's belief about the consequence of a strategy profile are often ambiguous, and players may have different optimistic attitudes with respect to a strategy profile. To handle this problem, this paper proposes a decision rule using the Hurwicz criterion and Dempster-Shafer theory. Based on this rule, we introduce a new kind of games, called ambiguous games, and propose a solution concept that is appropriate for this sort of games. Moreover, we also study how the beliefs regarding possible payoffs and optimistic attitudes may affect the solutions of such a game. To illustrate our model, we provide an analysis of a scenario concerning allocating resource of defending and attacking in military contexts.

Article information

Source
J. Appl. Math., Volume 2014 (2014), Article ID 531987, 10 pages.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 2 March 2015

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.jam/1425305516

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1155/2014/531987

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR3166772

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
07010671

Citation

Xiong, Wei. Games under Ambiguous Payoffs and Optimistic Attitudes. J. Appl. Math. 2014 (2014), Article ID 531987, 10 pages. doi:10.1155/2014/531987. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.jam/1425305516


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