Journal of Applied Mathematics

The Core and Nucleolus in a Model of Information Transferal

Dongshuang Hou and Theo Driessen

Full-text: Open access

Abstract

Galdeano et al. introduced the so-called information market game involving n identical firms acquiring a new technology owned by an innovator. For this specific cooperative game, the nucleolus is determined through a characterization of the symmetrical part of the core. The nonemptiness of the (symmetrical) core is shown to be equivalent to one of each, super additivity, zero-monotonicity, or monotonicity.

Article information

Source
J. Appl. Math., Volume 2012 (2012), Article ID 379848, 12 pages.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 2 January 2013

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.jam/1357153513

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1155/2012/379848

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR2979455

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
1251.91042

Citation

Hou, Dongshuang; Driessen, Theo. The Core and Nucleolus in a Model of Information Transferal. J. Appl. Math. 2012 (2012), Article ID 379848, 12 pages. doi:10.1155/2012/379848. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.jam/1357153513


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