Positional strategies in games of best choice

Aaron Fowlkes; Brant Jones

doi:10.2140/involve.2019.12.647

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Home > Journals > Involve > Volume 12 > Issue 4 > Article

2019 Positional strategies in games of best choice

Aaron Fowlkes, Brant Jones

Involve 12(4): 647-658 (2019). DOI: 10.2140/involve.2019.12.647

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Abstract

We study a variation of the game of best choice (also known as the secretary problem or game of googol) under an additional assumption that the ranks of interview candidates are restricted using permutation pattern-avoidance. We describe the optimal positional strategies and develop formulas for the probability of winning.

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Aaron Fowlkes. Brant Jones. "Positional strategies in games of best choice." Involve 12 (4) 647 - 658, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2140/involve.2019.12.647