Duke Mathematical Journal

The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory: Nobel Seminar, 8 December 1994

Harold W. Kuhn, John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten, Jörgen W. Weibull, Eric van Damme, John F. Nash, Jr., and Peter Hammerstein

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Duke Math. J., Volume 81, Number 1 (1995), 1-29.

First available in Project Euclid: 19 February 2004

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Primary: 90-03: Historical (must also be assigned at least one classification number from Section 01)
Secondary: 01A70: Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies 90Dxx


Kuhn, Harold W.; Harsanyi, John C.; Selten, Reinhard; Weibull, Jörgen W.; van Damme, Eric; Nash, Jr., John F.; Hammerstein, Peter. The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory: Nobel Seminar, 8 December 1994. Duke Math. J. 81 (1995), no. 1, 1--29. doi:10.1215/S0012-7094-95-08102-2. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.dmj/1077245457

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