Bulletin of Symbolic Logic

Gödel’s Program revisited, Part I: the turn to phenomenology

Kai Hauser

Full-text: Access denied (no subscription detected)

We're sorry, but we are unable to provide you with the full text of this article because we are not able to identify you as a subscriber. If you have a personal subscription to this journal, then please login. If you are already logged in, then you may need to update your profile to register your subscription. Read more about accessing full-text


Convinced that the classically undecidable problems of mathematics possess determinate truth values, Gödel issued a programmatic call to search for new axioms for their solution. The platonism underlying his belief in the determinateness of those questions in combination with his conception of intuition as a kind of perception have struck many of his readers as highly problematic. Following Gödel’s own suggestion, this article explores ideas from phenomenology to specify a meaning for his mathematical realism that allows for a defensible epistemology.

Article information

Bull. Symbolic Logic, Volume 12, Issue 4 (2006), 529-590.

First available in Project Euclid: 20 November 2006

Permanent link to this document

Digital Object Identifier

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)

Zentralblatt MATH identifier


Hauser, Kai. Gödel’s Program revisited, Part I: the turn to phenomenology. Bull. Symbolic Logic 12 (2006), no. 4, 529--590. doi:10.2178/bsl/1164056807. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.bsl/1164056807

Export citation