Bulletin of Symbolic Logic

Gödel’s Program revisited, Part I: the turn to phenomenology

Kai Hauser

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Abstract

Convinced that the classically undecidable problems of mathematics possess determinate truth values, Gödel issued a programmatic call to search for new axioms for their solution. The platonism underlying his belief in the determinateness of those questions in combination with his conception of intuition as a kind of perception have struck many of his readers as highly problematic. Following Gödel’s own suggestion, this article explores ideas from phenomenology to specify a meaning for his mathematical realism that allows for a defensible epistemology.

Article information

Source
Bull. Symbolic Logic, Volume 12, Issue 4 (2006), 529-590.

Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 20 November 2006

Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.bsl/1164056807

Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.2178/bsl/1164056807

Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR2283090

Zentralblatt MATH identifier
1126.03010

Citation

Hauser, Kai. Gödel’s Program revisited, Part I: the turn to phenomenology. Bull. Symbolic Logic 12 (2006), no. 4, 529--590. doi:10.2178/bsl/1164056807. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.bsl/1164056807


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