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VOL. 45 | 2004 A Rubinesque theory of decision


We generalize a set of axioms introduced by Rubin, A weak system of axioms for “rational” behavior and the nonseparability of utility from prior, Statistics & Decisions, to the case of partial preference. That is, we consider cases in which not all uncertain acts are comparable to each other. We demonstrate some relations between these axioms and a decision theory based on sets of probability/utility pairs. We illustrate by example how comparisons solely between pairs of acts is not sufficient to distinguish between decision makers who base their choices on distinct sets of probability/utility pairs.


Published: 1 January 2004
First available in Project Euclid: 28 November 2007

zbMATH: 1268.62009
MathSciNet: MR2126885

Digital Object Identifier: 10.1214/lnms/1196285378

Primary: 62C05
Secondary: 62A01

Keywords: partial preference

Rights: Copyright © 2004, Institute of Mathematical Statistics


Vol. 45 • 1 January 2004
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