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Reviewed by

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This is the first volume of what is planned as a two-volume biography of Bertrand Russell. It differs from previous biographies of Russell (such as Caroline Moorehead's *Bertrand Russell: A Life* [*1993*]), by integrating Russell's intellectual biography into his personal biography. Thus, it takes seriously Russell's own attestation in his *Autobiography* that the three dominating influences in his life were the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and pity for the suffering of mankind. It is far, however, from uncritically accepting at face value the platitudinous and self-congratulatory accounts which Russell himself gave of his own life and its motivations.

Of Russell's recent biographers, Monk, a philosopher who has already written a biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein, is in the best position to treat Russell's intellectual development as an integral aspect of his life. One may well ask, therefore, whether Monk was successful in integrating the personal and intellectual within the framework of his biography, and whether, as a result, we get a fuller portrait of Russell's life than we may acquire from other sources. The answer, with some reservation, to both questions, is affirmative. My reservation is tied to the perception that in unifying Russell's professional achievements with his emotional and personal biography, Monk has reduced the import of Russell's work in mathematics, logic, and philosophy to an aspect of his psychological being, conflating thereby motivations for the intellectual projects which Russell undertook with their

intrinsic academic significance and worth. Oddly, this is not to say thereby that Monk's approach is necessarily unjustified or without merit.

Monk's underlying thesis is that the primary, even primal, motivation behind Russell's thoughts, writings, and deeds was to present a specific public portrait of himself. Then certainly the professional activities which he undertook must be understood likewise as inseparable from the remainder of his personal and private life. In order to detail and provide evidence for Russell's emotional and psychological state, the pages of Monk's biography are heavily peppered with quotes from the correspondence and diaries of Russell and his acquaintances. This makes for ponderous reading, but gives far greater substance to the unflattering portrait of Russell's personality than is given by Moorehead's biography of Russell. In an important sense, Monk's biography provides the "clinical" evidence for and detailed and deeper explanation of the unflattering portrait of Russell's personality that one gleans from Moorehead's biography. Russell is now seen — whether or not Monk intentionally meant to paint *quite* so harsh and dark a picture — to be the consummate prevaricator, the pathological hypocrite, the egocentric bordering on megalomania, a man who at times took almost malicious pleasure in dispensing mental anguish on those closest to him, the man whose primary guiding principle is to cultivate a public image as the great intellect and genius and martyr for truth, humanity, and justice. Some sense of Russell's deliberate apparent dishonesty comes out in the way he reacted to the denial of the passport in the summer of 1916 that would have enabled him to return a second time to Harvard University. This followed his conviction for anti-war activities under the "Defense of the Realm Act". In one breath, he tells Ottoline Morrell that he had hoped to engage in peace propoganda while in America, in the next breath he avers that he hopes that "a fuss" will be made about his being denied a passport inasmuch as the [publically stated] purpose of trip was that he "was going to teach logic & that the Govt. thinks logic wd. put America against us" (*sic*; as quoted by Monk at pp. 464–465). Certainly Laura Jourdain must have felt Russell to be inhumanly insensitive as he continued, even with her husband Philip on his deathbed, to badger Jourdain for payment for a series of articles of his which Jourdain had published in *The Monist*, even while he refused to attend to Jourdain's proffered ostensible "proof" of the multiplicative axiom, although all who examined it, Russell and J. E. Littlewood included, asserted that it was in fact invalid (see Monk, pp. 561–562).

The ontogenesis of Russell's personality is traced to the childhood experience of being raised by a domineering Victorian grandmother who saw no good in Russell's mother, regarded her own son as insane, and whose love and acceptance of her family was conditional on absolute obedience to

strict codes of beliefs and behaviors which she imposed. Whereas Russell's older brother Frank demonstrably rebelled against the harshness and pitilessness of the household regime imposed by their grandmother and suffered the consequences until running away from home, Bertrand opted for a passive resistance, keeping his real thoughts to himself and outwardly playing the prig and the role which his grandmother required of him. He played this duplicitous game until he reached his majority, married, and thus escaped his grandmother's household, if not her total influence and the traumatic burdens which she had unwittingly placed upon him and habits of behavior that he developed to deal with these. Emotionally and psychologically scarred by this experience, Russell carried the patterns of behavior developed in his youth into his mature life, and these in turn impacted his professional choices. He sought in mathematics, especially at first in Euclidean geometry, the solace and certitude, as well as the untarnished absolute truth, that were lacking in his emotional and psychological being under the daily regime of his grandmother's wardship.

Monk makes it clear that he thinks Russell chose to concentrate his intellectual life on mathematics, logic, and philosophy as an antidote for and escape from his emotional and psychological existence in daily reality. Monk finds especially significant and telling the words of advice which Russell received from William James: "Say good-bye to mathematical logic if you wish to preserve your relations with concrete realities" (quoted by Monk at pp. 192, 202). To Philip E. B. Jourdain, Russell replied to James's advice that "I would much rather, of the two, preserve my relations with symbolic logic" (quoted by Monk, *loc. cit.*). As we trace the chronology of ups and downs and starts and stops of Russell's intellectual exertions in Monk's narrative, we find that Russell's attention to intellectual work decreases or even ceases when he becomes embroiled or preoccupied with his love life and increases or resumes when his love life recedes in intensity or fails. During the interims when he is not doing mathematics or philosophy moreover, he turns to political activity. His choice of political positions is determined in large measure by the heritage of his grandmother and her late husband Lord John Russell, a Liberal Prime Minister during the reign of Queen Victoria — and in some measure by the women to whom he becomes romantically inclined. Even at his professional and academic best, then, Russell's attitudes towards his work are marked by a kind of dilettantism.

Mathematics, logic, and philosophy, in Monk's presentation, by their emotional "sterility" offer Russell temporary respite from the rigors of robust reality of daily life. Confirmation that mathematics was little else than Russell's vehicle of escapism is found in Russell's unpublished auto-

biographical novel *The Perplexities of John Forstice*, where one of the characters representing Russell's *alter ego* declares (as quoted by Monk on p. 268) that "Mathematics gives most joy when life gives most disgust."

The most famous example of cessation of intellectual work in Russell's life involves the completion of work on the *Principia Mathematica*. The version disseminated by Russell himself in his *Autobiography* is that the decade of rigorous, demanding work on the *Principia* had exhausted him to the point of his being unable thereafter and ever after to do any new work in mathematics. I have suggested elsewhere [Anellis *1995*, 310] that at least part of the reason for Russell's abandonment of logic soon after completion of the *Principia* was that, without the assistance and guidance of Whitehead (or others), Russell was not as competent in the subject as he portrayed himself to be, and was probably incapable of carrying out original work in the field on his own. Monk (p. 202 and especially p. 225) offers a reason much less unflattering than mine to the portrayal of Russell's mathematical competence but much more reflective of Monk's thesis of the inverse relationship which intellectual work and emotional impingements had in Russell's psychological life. Monk asks (p. 202): "Would Russell have produced such important and original work in logic and philosophy if he had *not* been dead to the world of senses?"; and (at p. 225) he cites Russell's letter of June 1911 to his lover Ottoline Morrell that he will "have done all I ever intended to do in the way of mathematics — when the publication of the big book [*Principia Mathematica*] is finished, I should in any case do no more in that line . . . . ." In a letter to Ottoline of 4 November 1911, while taking some moments away from the continuing arduous task of proofreading *Principia*, Russell continues in a similar vein to say (as quoted by Monk, p. 239): "It is very unlikely that I shall ever do any more math'cal work," adding that "I feel it would only be more of the same kind which could just as well be done by some one else." In estimating the value of the *Principia*, he writes in the same letter to Ottoline (again, as quoted by Monk, p. 239) that the proofs of the *Principia* "have a sort of ghostly feeling. I wrote the stuff ages ago and have quite forgotten it. I dare say it is the most important work I shall ever have done, but it is hard to judge." It would seem from what Russell wrote to Ottoline about the *Principia* at this stage in his career that he is not quite assured of the value of the *Principia* itself, however much it may in his estimation represent his own best work. This attitude accords well with Monk's views on Russell's efforts. Nevertheless, Monk (p. 281) is quick to admit that Russell's "What Is Logic?", a late 1911 effort to write an article on the nature of logic, was an abortive

failure, "a series of halting, confused and inconclusive reflections, which centre on the definition of logic as 'the study of the forms of complexes'."

It is however certainly *not* the case therefore that Russell abandoned work in logic and foundations of mathematics altogether after completing work on *Principia*: witness his work on *Introduction to the Mathematical Philosophy* while imprisoned for anti-war activity during the First World War, although we can argue that he was never again so successful or sustained in these later efforts.

Russell's intense work on *Principia Mathematica* is seen by Monk as an emotional cover for his failed marriage to Alys Pearsall Smith; and Russell's loss of interest in *Principia* coincides almost precisely with his failed love affair with Alfred North Whitehead's wife Evelyn and then the promising one with Ottoline Morrell, and it is left to Evelyn Whitehead at this moment to act as the intermediary for Russell between Alys and Ottoline and between each and Russell. Deeply involved now with Ottoline, Russell found the "endless proofreading" in checking the galleys for the *Principia* to be a "distraction" from his attention to Ottoline. Moreover, he begins now to lose faith even in the *correctness* of the work of the *Principia*. Indeed, even as early as the period when he was working on the simple theory of types to rescue his system of logic from the Russell paradox, if not before while pursuing other rescue measures, Russell lost faith in the correctness of the enterprise embodied by the *Principles of Mathematics* to erect a solid, irrefutable, logical foundation for mathematics; and by extension had little faith in the validity of logicism and the work of the *Principia*. The work on the *Principia*, if I correctly understand and apply Monk's interpretation of Russell's psychology, was an excuse first to find an outlet for or alternative to the emotional trauma of the unsatisfactory marriage to Alys, and then afforded an opportunity to attempt an affair with Evelyn Whitehead. Little more.

I had contended [Anellis *1995*, 306 and esp. 310] that the errors found in Russell's early drafts of *Principia* should most probably be attributed to Russell's imperfect grasp of the technical details of logic. But Monk (pp. 157–158) makes it clear that Russell attributes the errors in his preliminary draft of *Principia* on his emotional state of mind in the wake of the breakup of his marriage to Alys, and, thinks Monk, properly so. Whether Monk is correct in assessing the grounds for the weaknesses in Russell's early contributions to the writing of the *Principia* or I am, it seems that Russell's autobiographical explanation for giving up work in mathematical is disingenuous at best.

By the time of his first encounters with Wittgenstein in the autumn of 1911 and while still at work proofreading *Principia*, Russell had effectively given up work in philosophy and foundations of mathematics and in logic and moved on to philosophy proper, in particular to the technical concern with metaphysics as found in his logical atomism and to epistemology. The forays which he also made at this juncture in his career made into popular [i.e. nontechnical] philosophy were largely inspired, if we accept Monk's views, by his desire to establish an intellectual and spiritual rapport with Ottoline Morrell. Thus, the larger second half of Monk's book, apart from its sketch of the conditions under which Russell wrote his *Introduction to the Mathematical Philosophy*, is of comparatively little special interest to historians of logic, except for the reflected light it throws on Russell's, already noted, between Russell's psychic and mental development, between his emotional and intellectual life, and on the already observed nature and content of his character, providing new confirmations about the conclusions we have already drawn, with Monk's aid, about Russell and his work.

In the course of his narrative, Monk raises a number of issues of especial interest to historians of logic, some of which I have touched upon in other contexts (although Monk has, perhaps needless to say, done so without any reference to my treatments of these points). This offers me the opportunity to test, and where necessary correct, some of my previous assertions. I will list these points in the order in which they are raised by Monk, and treat those which require me to make additional comments or corrections to those which I had raised, but simply record the others.

In "A Minor Mystery Solved" [Anellis *1986*], I suggested that it was a reading of Harkness and Morley' *An Introduction to the Theory of Analytic Functions* (1898) that led Russell into adopting the modern conception of numbers and led him away from the classical views which he had expressed up to that point. Monk (pp. 113–114), however, asserts that "Russell's conversations with Morley, Harkness and others in America" in the autumn of 1896 "was enough to dent severely his Hegelian confidence that mathematics was irremediably enmeshed in contradictions, at least to the extent of resolving to improve his knowledge of modern German mathematics," although its full impact did not occur immediately. Thus, Monk agrees that the views of Harkeness and Morley, and in particular their effort to make Russell aware of the work of such mathematicians as Weierstrass, led Russell to modernize his conception of number, but traces the genesis of this to Russell's meeting with them rather than, as I had, to his reading of their work. (For a characterization of the development of Russell's thought on this matter and an elaboration of the views which Russell espoused, see, e.g. [Anellis *1987b*], epecially pp. 317–319.)

Monk (p. 116) notes that Russell first saw "a *mathematical* treatment of symbolic logic, which, in Whitehead's view, is a sort of algebra," in his reading in 1898 of Whitehead's newly published *Treatise of Universal Algebra.* (This evidentally accords in large part with Victor Lowe's assertion [Lowe *1985*, 231] that it was at the beginning of 1898 that Russell "became acquainted with . . . symbolic logic, through the works of Boole and later logicians, and Book II of Whitehead's *Universal* Algebra" and with our knowledge that the first record that Russell read Schröder's work occurs in September 1900, that he confessed to having not read Peirce's work in logic until 1901, that he took notes on two of Peirce's papers in logic *circa* 1900–1901, and that he was at least aware of, if not familiar with, Peirce's work at least as early as February 1899, when he asked Louis Couturat about it. See [Anellis *1995*, 280, 282].)

Monk (p. 143) estimates that Whitehead may have had a better appreciation for the significance of the Russell paradox sooner than did Russell himself. When first told by Russell of the Russell paradox, Whitehead "seemed to appreciate immediately that it presented a fundamental and difficult challenge. . . . What Whitehead perhaps saw immediately — and Russell was to see only gradually — was that the Paradox showed something to be wrong with the very notion of a 'class' as Russell had hoped to use it in his logical foundations for mathematics." However, I have argued [Anellis *1984*, 9–11; *1987a*, 23–25; *1991*] that Russell already had a version of the paradox as early as 8 December 1900, even though he may not have immediately realized it's full nature as a *paradox*, although he already took it to be a very serious flaw in Cantorian set theory requiring a difficult argument to elaborate fully. Unfortunately, Monk does not tell us what the formulation of the paradox Russell presented to Whitehead at this juncture, or even *when* he first presented it to him. It is therefore difficult to say whether, and in what regard, Whitehead had a better grasp than Russell of the significance of the result which Russell conveyed to him. In any case, it is extremely difficult to believe that Russell would *not* apprehend the significance of a paradox once he recognized it as such in light of the Hegelian philosophy of mathematics and its dialectical enshrinement of contradictions which he had only a few years earlier espoused (see, e.g. [Anellis *1986/87*; *1987c*]).

In his enthusiasm for self-congratulations, Russell proclaimed his work in *The Principles of Mathematics* to be the establishment of a "new subject" in his project to demonstrate that mathematics is founded on nothing more than logic. Nevertheless, upon reading the works of Frege, Russell was obliged to admit, if only privately to Couturat, that he "found

many things in it [*viz.* Frege's *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* — I.A.] which I believed I had invented" (Monk, p. 153, quoting Russell's letter to Couturat of 25 June 1902).

Monk reports (p. 349) that Russell was most favorably impressed by Victor Lenzen, who had come from the University of California to Harvard University "specially to study with Russell" during Russell's early 1914 visit to the U.S. It would, Lenzen's tutor C. I. Lewis said, be "the chance of a lifetime." Lenzen registered for Russell's logic course and recorded Russell "as appearing to the students as 'an almost superhuman person. I cannot adequately describe the respect, adoration, and even awe which he inspired'" (Monk, p. 349, quoting Lenzen [*1971*]).

Monk's book is a ponderous and difficult work to read. It fortifies and explains the portrait of Russell that we receive from reading Moorehead's biography of Russell. But it reduces Russell's intellectual biography to a mere aspect of his psychological biography, and while we gain considerable insight into the personal motivations of Russell's life, work and thought, we gain little insight into the intellectual influences on the direction of his work and thought. These intellectual influences appear as only secondary, we may even say *minimal*, in the development of Russell's professional work as that development is seen from Monk's account. Thus, for example, we are told (p. 234) that Russell kept busts of Spinoza and Leibniz in his study and in his imagination "discussed" his work with these two philosophers in the autumn of 1911 while he was writing his paper "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars"; but we neither know just what was "said" nor are we told by Monk what influences their philosophical views had on the work at hand. What is lacking in Monk's treatment of the intellectual development of Russell's thought is a reconstruction and analysis of Russell's intellectual development. Let us momentarily set aside Freud's famous — or infamous — retro-psychoanalytic (or "psycho-assinine", to borrow a phrase from novelist Vladimir Nabakov from another context) biography of Leonardo Da Vinci and the debates among historians — debates which have evidently escaped Monk's notice — of the relevance and merits of psychobiography and psychohistory as bad history and worse psychology. Psychobiography is nonetheless *not* intellectual biography. Consequently, although Monk's biography of Russell *may* illuminate those recesses of Russell's psyche which led him towards his work in mathematics, logic and philosophy and to his attitudes towards his work (and helps us to understand the emotional side of Russell's inner psychic and outer personal life, including his relations with his grandmother, his wife, and his lovers and lovers *manqué*), it does *not* illuminate or account for the

contents of his thought or manifest the ideas and works which contributed to their development in Russell's work.

It would appear from Monk's treatment (pp. 116–118, 165) that only G. E. Moore's concept of a *proposition* as developed in Moore's paper "On the Nature of Judgment" published in the January 1898 issue of the philosophy journal *Mind*, or at least this work more than any other, had a serious, sustained, and deep influence on Russell's work, and was (although Monk does not say so, either implicitly or explicitly) appropriated with modification but without proper ascription in the theory of descriptions in Russell's famous article "On Denoting" of 1905 to be offered as a tool for avoidance of the Russell paradox.

Discussion of the work of other of Russell's colleagues appears pale by contrast with the attention given by Monk to Moore's theory of judgment for its direct influence on Russell and for its role in the shaping of his intellectual life. Wittgenstein, for example, in Monk's treatment, seems to be of interest and importance to Russell only to the extent that and only for as long as Russell sees in him a mirror image of his own intellectual side and a successor and surrogate to himself in philosophy of logic and helps Russell to find a new (or renewed) appreciation for the *Principia* as an aesthetic masterpiece (see, e.g., Monk, pp. 239–241, 250–251, and especially pp. 262, 280). When Russell's relationship with Ottoline was ending and Russell was turning back to thoughts of doing serious work again, it was Wittgenstein's ideas that helped shape Russell's plans for the type of work he would next undertake (see Monk, pp. 278–279); that work would be a discussion on the question "What is Logic?" in response to the ideas on the subject that Wittgenstein was beginning to formulate in what became his "Notes on Logic", a forerunner to his *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* (see, e.g., Monk, pp. 325–326). What particularly attracted Russell was Wittgenstein's apparent single-minded total and impassioned dedication to philosophy of logic. Russell even went so far as to express an envy for Peano's absorption in and dedication to intellectual work (Monk, p. 279, quoting Russell's letter to Ottoline Morrell of 21 August 1912). What Russell did not yet realize at the end of 1912, Monk notes (pp. 289–290), but certainly must have by the Spring of 1913 when his relationship with Wittgenstein began to crumble, was that Wittgenstein's work was leading him towards the demolition of the heart of the *Principia*, rather than correction, or "fine-tuning" as Russell then thought. By the time Russell was working on his first major non-mathematical philosophical work *The Theory of Knowledge*, he was acquiescing in almost every philosophical matter to Wittgenstein's views (see, e.g., Monk, p. 296), however much it overturned his own views, and at first dismissing as logic or philosophy of

logic, and consequently to be left to Wittgenstein to solve, nearly every difficulty or impasse he encountered — issues which seem more properly to belong to philosophy of language than logic or philosophy of logic. Nevertheless, the intellectual influence of Wittgenstein began to fade quickly once his personal relationship deteriorated. For his part, by the summer of 1913, Wittgenstein (Monk reports on p. 300) was ready to declare that in the work of understanding the nature of logic Russell was no longer of any use to him. Simultaneously with the collapse, if not yet complete rupture, of Russell's rocky relationship with Wittgenstein was the parallel collapse, if not yet final rupture, in the first days of 1914 of his stormy relationship with Ottoline Morrell. Soon thereafter, having completed a "Preface" to the English translation of Poincaré's *Science and Method* (1914), in which Russell defended mathematical logic against Poincaré, and he turns next, spurred by the outbreak of the First World War, to politics and *affaires de cœur*. Russell did not work again either in logic or mathematics or their philosophy until writing the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* and the "Introduction" to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, the former written, as we have already noted, while in prison during World War I the latter a year later, in 1919. That done, he ceased altogether attempting original work in these areas.

The impulse to write what became the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* was announced in a letter to Philip Jourdain of 5 September 1917. In another letter to Jourdain a few days later, Russell explained that what he had in mind was to revise *The Principles of Mathematics*. Monk (p. 503) finds from Russell's description to Jourdain of his project that "for the most part, they do not present new thoughts and directions, but rather a reworking of old ground," adding suggestively that "[o]ne cannot help feeling that, at this stage, his desire to return to philosophy was motivated, not by a burst of new inspiration, but rather by a wish to retreat from the tedium, strain and, occasionally, the violence of political activism." In writing from prison on 1 July 1918 (quoted by Monk, p. 532), Russell declared that "I had given up logic years ago in despair of finding out anything more about it, but now I begin to see hope." The truth, as we know, is that there is little if anything innovative in the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. But the philosophy of "logical atomism" that Russell developed at this very time is evidentally deemed to be of considerable novelty and import by philosophers.

The *Introduction* is based in large measure on one of a series of public lectures to a non-academic audience that were planned for the autumn and winter of 1917-18. The series of eight Tuesday evening lectures on mathematical logic was begun on 30 October 1917 (but evidently was not,

as I had hitherto incorrectly believed, left uncompleted as a result of Russell's arrest and prison sentence). The lectures themselves, Monk tells us (p. 504) were either left unwritten or the manuscripts failed to survive; Russell is, however, known to have prepared a syllabus. Later (p. 532), Monk surmises that the lectures had in fact been written out; he tells us that "[f]rom May until the first few weeks of August 1918," Russell

> enjoyed a spell of concentrated absorption in philosophical questions of a kind that he had not enjoyed since finishing *Principia*. . . .
>
> His first philosophical task was to write up the lectures on mathematical logic, which he had delivered the previous autumn, as *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*. This he accomplished astonishingly quickly. By 21 May, he had written 20,000 words of the book and just six days later he had 'nearly finished' 70,000 of it. This phenomenal rate (even by Russell's standards) —nearly 10,000 words a day — suggests that much of the writing consisted to little more than transcribing what he had already written for his lectures.

The nature of the bulk of the audience (with the most notable exceptions of Russell's logic student from Harvard, Victor Lenzen; mathematics graduate from Paris Jean Nicod; Dorothy Wrinch, then a mathematics graduate at Girton College and subsequently a mathematics faculty member at Cambridge University and thereafter at Smith College; and J. J. Thomson, President of the Royal Society) to which Russell delivered his lectures was such that the lectures, like the *Introduction* that followed, was what Monk describes (p. 505) as "[e]ssentially . . . a popularised summary of the mathematical logic of *Principia Mathematica*. . . . It is supposedly intelligible to complete beginners with little or no training in mathematics . . . ." In Russell's mind, *The Principles of Mathematics* was written, Monk adds (p. 506), with "its purpose being to provide as much understanding of mathematical logic as is needed to philosophise on the subject" — but not very much more. We can of course appreciate that Russell would not, could not, and should not be expected to deliver more than a popular summary of mathematical logic, lectures devoid of technical or new and original results, to the audience at which these lectures were directed; but we nonetheless are led once again to ask whether, without the technical aid of someone such as Whitehead, Russell *could* have at this stage produced new or significant work in logic. An example of the sort of reader Russell had in mind for the *Introduction*, Monk suggests (pp. 505–506) is the novelist May Sinclair, who was also an amateur philosopher under the infuence of Hegelianism and quite accomplished as a

popularizer of philosophy. Russell felt that Sinclair, whose book *A Defense of Idealism* Russell took sufficiently seriously to review twice, would not be a Hegelian if she undertook to understand the rudiments of mathematical logic and logical symbolism as presented in the *Introduction.*

To Jourdain's chagrin, the *Introduction* failed to answer in enough detail the question "What Is Logic?" that Russell had promised Jourdain he would treat in an article or series of articles for the journal *The Monist.* That project, first proposed before the First World War, had been effectively and definitively scotched earlier, as we saw, in the bitter encounters on the subject with Wittgenstein. In the second series of lectures for the popular audience, the "Lectures on Logical Atomism", Russell turned to the subject over which he and Wittgenstein had argued. Although Russell did not now blindly follow Wittgenstein, as he had earlier done, the influence of Wittgenstein was patent in the text of these lectures. Thus, Monk tells us (pp. 559, 568) that in the latter part of 1919 when treating the manuscript of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, Russell could tell Wittgenstein only that he agreed with the assertion in the *Tractatus* that logical propositions are tautologies — to which Wittgenstein responded that this was *not* the main thesis of his work — and that Wittgenstein was probably correct in thinking the *Tractatus* to be an important work, although he could not agree with Wittgenstein's interpretation of the relationship between mathematics and logic. "The direction in which Russell was being pulled by this train of thought," Monk writes (p. 518), "was diametrically opposed to that which had characterized his earlier work. Earlier, he had been concerned to 'de-psychologize' logic and mathematics . . . . Now — though he was probably not fully aware of it at this stage — the natural conclusion to what he was saying was that psychology was actually *more* fundamental to philosophy than logic." This flirtation with psychologism was, however, quite brief, and, as Monk notes (p. 572), he backpedaled from it within days of his exchanges with Wittgenstein over the *Tractatus.*

By contrast to his interest in Wittgenstein, the popular French philosopher of the day, Henri Bergson, was of interest to Russell only because Bergson was considered *chic* at the time by Russell's colleagues and Russell saw in Bergson's philosophy of "creative evolution" or *élan vital* the vitalistic antipode of himself as the rational, dispassionate logic (and the extreme embodiment of his own passionate self). Finally, in Russell's post-*Principia* move away from logic to applications of logic as a tool for investigations in physical science, metaphysics and epistemology, Monk tells us (p. 287), Russell acquired many of his ideas and themes from Whitehead, who at that time was working alone on a planned fourth volume

of *Principia* to be devoted to development of geometry through logic; but, Monk thinks that Russell "understates" the importance of his borrowings from Whitehead, without, however, really ever saying precisely why or how. What is clear is that Monk holds that Russell's conceptions of the nature of logic and philosophy are in 1912 closer to Whitehead's than to Wittgenstein's. It was, in Russell's retrospective estimation (see Monk, p. 487), Whitehead's refusal, in early January 1917, to permit Russell to make use of his preparatory notes for the prospective fourth volume of *Principia* that definitively ended their collaboration.

In the course of his visit to China in the autumn of 1920, Russell firmly and finally decided against accepting a position which he was offered at Cambridge to teach logic and foundations of mathematics, and consequently effectively ceased doing sustained serious original work, not only in logic but technical philosophy as a professional as well. Monk (p. 594) attrributes much of this decision to Russell's reading of Wittgenstein in 1919 and to his concomitant "growing disbelief in the reality of the world of mathematics," which was "completed by the end of 1919 by his acceptance of a view that made both logic and mathematics trivial." Monk attributes the remainder of this decision to Russell's desire to no longer escape, but rather to embrace, worldly life, to his burgeoning relationship with Dora Black (who soon thereafter became his wife) and to the birth of his first child.

Whereas the search for knowledge may be one of the three passions that shaped Russell's life and although Monk's biography is the first and only one to date to seek to incorporate this intellectual passion into his biography of Russell, only the psychological, motivational aspects of this passion, and not the record and intellectual aspects of the actual search itself, plays any serious role in Monk's account.

The overall result of reading Monk's book is disappointing and painful, as is the impression it gives. This nonetheless does nothing to lessen the fact that publication of Monk's tome is an important event in and addition to Russell studies.

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