

218. The Separable Axiomatization of the Intermediate Propositional Systems S_n of Gödel

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In [3] Gödel introduced a series of many-valued propositional systems S_n , which is widely known and is quite frequently made use of when propositional systems are treated. And in our paper [6] we introduced two kinds of axiomatization for these S_n . But the *separation theorem* mentioned below does not hold on those axiomatized systems.

Separation Theorem. *A provable formula in the system can be proved using only the axioms for implication and those for the logical symbols actually appearing in the formula.*

We introduce, in this paper, another axiomatization for S_n and prove the separation theorem on them.

§ 1. Preliminaries. **Definition 1.1.** *S_n is a many-valued propositional system, whose values are integers $1, 2, \dots, n$ and ω (ω is regarded greater than any positive integers), and whose sole designated value is 1. Logical operations \supset, \wedge, \vee , and \neg are defined in S_n as follows:*

$$v_1 \supset v_2 = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v_1 \geq v_2, \\ v_2 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

$$v_1 \wedge v_2 = \max(v_1, v_2),$$

$$v_1 \vee v_2 = \min(v_1, v_2),$$

$$\neg v = v \supset \omega.$$

An extension of S_n is **LC** of Dummett [2], in which values are defined to be all the positive integers and ω .

By $S \vdash A$, we mean that a formula A is provable (or valid) in the axiomatic system (or model) S . By $S + A_1 + \dots + A_k$, we mean an axiomatic system obtained by adding the axiom schemes A_1, \dots, A_k to an axiomatic system S . If S_1 and S_2 are two systems axiomatic or defined by a model, we mean by $S_1 \supset S_2$ that the set of all provable or valid formulas of S_2 is included in that of S_1 . And $S_1 \supset \subset S_2$ means that $S_1 \supset S_2$ and $S_2 \supset S_1$. If f is an assignment function of a model, we mean by $f(A)$ the value calculated for the formula A by the assignment f .

Lemma 1.2. $S_1 \supset S_2 \supset \dots \supset S_n \supset \dots \supset \text{LC} \supset \text{LI}$, where **LI** is the intuitionistic system and S_1 coincides with the usual classical

system.

We omit the proof since the lemma can be easily proved. We call a system between the classical and the intuitionistic as *intermediate*.

§ 2. Former Axiomatizations. Definition 2.1. We define some formulas as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} X_n &= \bigvee_{1 \leq i < j \leq n+1} (a_i \supset a_j) \wedge (a_j \supset a_i), \\ T_n &= \bigvee_{1 \leq i \leq n+1} a_i, \\ F_n &= \bigvee_{1 \leq i \leq n+1} \neg a_i, \\ Y_n &= X_n \vee (T_n \wedge F_n), \\ R_n &= a_n \vee (a_n \supset a_{n-1}) \vee \cdots \vee (a_2 \supset a_1) \vee \neg a_1, \\ Z &= ((a_1 \supset a_2) \supset a_3) \supset (((a_2 \supset a_1) \supset a_3) \supset a_3), \end{aligned}$$

where a_i 's are propositional variables.

Dummett [2] obtained the

Lemma 2.2. $LC \supset \subset LI + Z$.

And we proved in [4] and [5] that the separation theorem holds on $LI + Z$.

In [6] is proved the

Lemma 2.3. $S_n \supset \subset LI + Z + X_{n+1} + Y_n \supset \subset LI + R_n$.

The separation theorem does not hold on these axiomatizations, since the newly added axiom schemes X_{n+1} , Y_n , and R_n contain logical symbols other than the implication.

§ 3. Separability. A formula is called an *I* (or *C*, or *D*, or *N*) formula if it contains only implication (or conjunction, or disjunction, or negation) as its logical symbols. An *IC* formula is a formula in which no logical symbols other than implication and conjunction are contained. An *IC* axiom is an axiom which is an *IC* formula. An *IC* theorem is a theorem which is an *IC* formula and is provable from *IC* axioms. An *IC* proof is a proof in which only *IC* axioms are used. A system is *IC* complete if the theorems which are *IC* formulas are *IC* theorems. Other combinations are defined similarly. A system is called *separable* if the separation theorem holds on it.

We proved in [4] the

Lemma 3.1. *If an intermediate propositional system satisfies the following (1), (2), and (3), it is separable.*

(1) *The system is constructed by adding some new I axioms to a separable intuitionistic propositional system.*

(2) *The system is I complete.*

(3) *There exist I formulas $F_i(a, b)$ ($i=1, \dots, k$) whose propositional variables are only a and b such that formulas of the forms*

$$D_i: a \vee b \supset F_i(a, b) \quad (i=1, \dots, k),$$

$$D_0: F_1(a, b) \supset (\dots \supset (F_k(a, b) \supset a \vee b) \dots),$$

are *ID* theorems.

The condition (3) can be weakened to (3') below.

(3') *The formulas D_i 's and D_0 are theorems.*

Proof. Since $a \supset a \vee b$ and $b \supset a \vee b$ are intuitionistic theorems, we get *I* theorems $a \supset F_i(a, b)$ and $b \supset F_i(a, b)$ from the theorem D_i . Hence $a \vee b \supset F_i(a, b)$ is an *ID* theorem. And since

$$a \vee b \supset ((a \supset c) \supset ((b \supset c) \supset c))$$

is an intuitionistic theorem, we get an *I* theorem

$$F_1(a, b) \supset (\dots \supset (F_k(a, b) \supset ((a \supset c) \supset ((b \supset c) \supset c))))$$

from D_0 . Here we put c to be $a \vee b$, and from $a \supset a \vee b$ and $b \supset a \vee b$ we get the *ID* theorem D_0 .

An example of the separable intuitionistic system is the system of Kleene [7]. And hereafter we mean by **LI** the intuitionistic system of Kleene or some other separable ones.

§ 4. **LP_n**. Recently Nagata [8] defined a sequence of formulas P_n and systems **LP_n** as follows:

Definition 4.1.

$$P_1 = ((a_1 \supset a_0) \supset a_1) \supset a_1.$$

$$P_n = ((a_n \supset P_{n-1}) \supset a_n) \supset a_n.$$

$$\mathbf{LP}_n = \mathbf{LI} + P_n.$$

One of his results concerning this sequence is the

Lemma 4.2. $S_n \supset \mathbf{LP}_n$, but not $S_{n+1} \supset \mathbf{LP}_n$; and

$$S_1 \supset \mathbf{LP}_1 \supset \mathbf{LP}_2 \supset \dots \supset \mathbf{LP}_n \supset \dots \supset \mathbf{LI}.$$

Now we prove two lemmas concerning P_n .

Lemma 4.3. Not $\mathbf{LP}_n \supset S_n$, if $n \geq 2$.

Proof. Let **M** be a 5-valued system as follows:

\supset	1	2	3	4	ω	\wedge	1	2	3	4	ω
1	1	2	3	4	ω	1	1	2	3	4	ω
2	1	1	3	4	ω	2	2	2	3	4	ω
3	1	1	1	4	4	3	3	3	3	ω	ω
4	1	1	3	1	3	4	4	4	ω	4	ω
ω	1	1	1	1	1	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω	ω
\vee	1	2	3	4	ω	\neg					
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	ω				
2	1	2	2	2	2	2	ω				
3	1	2	3	2	3	3	4				
4	1	2	2	4	4	4	3				
ω	1	2	3	4	ω	ω	1				

the value 1 is the designated value. Then it is easily seen that $M \supset LI$. $M \vdash Z$ is not true since

$$((3 \supset 4) \supset 2) \supset (((4 \supset 3) \supset 2) \supset 2) = 2.$$

$P_1 \neq 1$ if and only if $a_1 = 2$ and $a_0 = 3, 4$, or ω , and then $P_1 = 2$. Hence if $n \geq 2$, $P_n \neq 1$ if and only if $a_n = 2$ and $P_{n-1} = 3, 4$, or ω . But P_{n-1} only gets the value 1 or 2, if $n \geq 2$. Hence $LP_n \supset S_n$ does not hold if $n \geq 2$.

Lemma 4.4. $LC + P_n \vdash R_n$.

Proof. Let Q_n be a formula obtained from P_n by substituting a_0 by $a_1 \wedge \neg a_1$. Let f be an assignment function of LC assigning values v_1, \dots, v_n to propositional variables a_1, \dots, a_n . Then $f(Q_n) = f(R_n)$ holds since $f(Q_n)$ and $f(R_n)$ are not 1 if and only if $1 < v_n < v_{n-1} < \dots < v_1 < \omega$ and on that occasion they both get the value v_n .

§ 5. New Axiomatization. **Definition 5.1.** $MP_n = LC + P_n$ (that is, $MP_n = LI + Z + P_n = LP_n + Z$).

By 4.3, LP_n does not give an axiomatization for S_n . But by 4.4, $MP_n \supset S_n$. And by 4.2, $S_n \vdash P_n$, hence $S_n \supset MP_n$. So we have the

Theorem 5.2. $S_n \supset \subset MP_n$.

This MP_n is another axiomatization for S_n . And the main purpose of this paper is to prove that the separation theorem holds on this MP_n if we take for LI a separable intuitionistic system such as that of Kleene [7].

Since we have the lemma 3.1, we only need to prove that MP_n satisfies the three conditions of 3.1. But the added axioms to LI are all I axioms, so (1) is satisfied. And

$$a \vee b \supset ((a \supset b) \supset b), \quad a \vee b \supset ((b \supset a) \supset a),$$

and $((a \supset b) \supset b) \supset (((b \supset a) \supset a) \supset a \vee b)$ are (ID) theorems of LC , hence they are (ID) theorems of MP_n and (3) is satisfied. So we only need to prove that MP_n is I complete. Before we prove that, we must make some preparations.

An assignment function f is almost always considered with relation to some formulas, in other words, to a set of some propositional variables $\{a_1, \dots, a_m\}$. Let v_i be the value assigned to a_i by f ($1 \leq i \leq m$). By $V(f)$, we mean the set $\{v_1, \dots, v_m\}$, and by $M_f(i)$ the i -th maximum value of $V(f)$ (we omit the subscript f if there occurs no confusion), and by $H(f)$ the number of different values in $V(f)$, and by f_k an assignment function which assigns to a_i the value 1 if $f(a_i) \leq k$ and the value $f(a_i)$ otherwise.

Lemma 5.3. *If A is an I formula and $S_n \vdash A$ and if f is an assignment function of LC such that $H(f) \leq n$, or $H(f) = n + 1$ and $V(f) \ni 1$, then $f(A) = 1$.*

Proof. The operation \supset depends only on the relation \geq between the values, and $v_1 \supset v_2$ does not get a value other than 1 or v_2 . So the calculation of $f(A)$ just goes as in S_n under the condition of the lemma.

Theorem 5.4. (*I completeness.*) *If A is an I formula and $S_n \vdash A$, then A is provable in MP_n by using only I axioms.*

Proof. Let b_1, \dots, b_k be all the propositional variables appearing in the formula A . We assume, without loss of generality, that $k \geq n+1$ since if not, we can take as A the I formula

$$(b_{k+1} \supset b_{k+1}) \supset (\dots \supset ((b_{n+1} \supset b_{n+1}) \supset A) \dots)$$

which is equivalent to A . Let ρ be a mapping function of $\{a_0, \dots, a_n\}$ into $\{b_1, \dots, b_k\}$. Then we define P_n^* to be the conjunction

$$\bigwedge_{\text{all } \rho} P_n(\rho(a_0), \dots, \rho(a_n)),$$

where $P_n(\rho(a_0), \dots, \rho(a_n))$ means the formula obtained by substituting a_i by $\rho(a_i)$ in P_n ($0 \leq i \leq n$). Now let f be an assignment function of LC . We prove that $f(P_n^* \supset A) = 1$.

If $H(f) \leq n$, or if $H(f) = n+1$ and $V(f) \ni 1$, then $f(A) = 1$ by 5.3.

If $H(f) = n+1$ and $V(f) \not\ni 1$, or $H(f) > n+1$, $f(P_n^*) = M(n+1)$ since $f(P_n) \neq 1$ if and only if $1 < v_n < v_{n-1} < \dots < v_0$ and on that occasion $f(P_n) = v_n$. Hence $f(P_n^* \supset A) = f_{M(n+1)}(A) = 1$ since $H(f_{M(n+1)}) = n+1$ and $V(f_{M(n+1)}) \ni 1$.

Since $(B_1 \wedge \dots \wedge B_m \supset C) \equiv (B_1 \supset (B_2 \supset (\dots \supset (B_m \supset C) \dots)))$ is a theorem in LC , $P_n^* \supset A$ can be transformed to an equivalent I formula of the form $Q_1 \supset (Q_2 \supset (\dots \supset (Q_m \supset A) \dots))$, where each Q_i is a substituted form of P_n . And this transformed formula is provable in LC . By the I completeness of LC (cf. [1] or [5]), it is provable by using only I axioms. On the other hand, each Q_i is provable in MP_n by using the I axiom P_n . Hence by the modus ponens, A is proved by I axioms only.

By this proof of I completeness of MP_n , the separation theorem is proved on MP_n .

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