

A Note on the Principle of Predication

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Let A be a well-formed formula of first-order modal logic whose only free variable is x . We shall use the following abbreviations:

$\underline{Mat}(A)$ for $(x)[\diamond A \wedge \diamond \sim A]$
 $\underline{Form}(A)$ for $(x)[\Box A \vee \Box \sim A]$
 $\underline{Ban}(A)$ for $((x)\Box A) \vee ((x)\Box \sim A)$
 $\underline{Pred}(A)$ for $\underline{Form}(A) \vee \underline{Mat}(A)$.

We read $\underline{Mat}(A)$, $\underline{Form}(A)$, and $\underline{Ban}(A)$ respectively as: “ A is material”, “ A is formal”, and “ A is banal”; $\underline{Pred}(A)$ is the assertion of the Principle of Predication for A .

We prove that if F and M are formulas whose only free variable is x such that $\underline{Ban}(F)$, $\underline{Form}(F)$, and $\underline{Mat}(M)$ are true in any suitable T -model, then $\underline{Pred}(F \wedge M)$ and $\underline{Pred}(F \vee M)$ are not acceptable as axioms.

Theorem *The formulas:*

- (1) $\sim \underline{Ban}(F) \wedge \underline{Form}(F) \wedge \underline{Mat}(M) \supset \sim \underline{Pred}(M \wedge F)$
- (2) $\sim \underline{Ban}(F) \wedge \underline{Form}(F) \wedge \underline{Mat}(M) \supset \sim \underline{Pred}(M \vee F)$

are T -valid.

Proof: Let $\langle W, R, D, Q, V \rangle$ be a T -model ([1], p. 171) and $w_i \in W$. If $V(\sim \underline{Ban}(F) \wedge \underline{Form}(F) \wedge \underline{Mat}(M), w_i) = 1$ then $V(\sim \underline{Ban}(F), w_i) = 1$ and there exist $a, b \in D_i$ such that:

- (3) $V^a(\diamond \sim F, w_i) = 1$ and $V^b(\diamond F, w_i) = 1$

where V^a and V^b are just like V except for assigning a and b , respectively, to x .

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Since $V(\text{Form}(F), w_i) = 1$, we have $V^a(\Box F \vee \Box \sim F, w_i) = 1$ and $V^b(\Box F \vee \Box \sim F, w_i) = 1$; hence by (3),

$$(4) \quad V^a(\Box \sim F, w_i) = 1 \text{ and } V^b(\Box F, w_i) = 1.$$

By hypothesis, $V(\text{Mat}(M), w_i) = 1$ and therefore $V^b(\Diamond M \wedge \Diamond \sim M, w_i) = 1$. Then there exist $w_h, w_k \in W$ such that $w_i R w_h, w_i R w_k, V^b(M, w_h) = 1, V^b(\sim M, w_k) = 1$; and by (4):

$$(5) \quad V^b(M \wedge F, w_h) = V^b(\sim(M \wedge F), w_k) = 1.$$

Now if we assume that $V(\text{Mat}(M \wedge F), w_i) = 1$, it follows that $V^a(\Diamond(M \wedge F) \wedge \Diamond(\sim(M \wedge F)), w_i) = 1$ and therefore $V^a(\Diamond F, w_i) = 1$, which contradicts (4). If we assume that $V(\text{Form}(M \wedge F), w_i) = 1$, it follows that $V^b(\Box(M \wedge F) \vee \Box(\sim(M \wedge F)), w_i) = 1$ which contradicts (5). Consequently, $V(\sim \text{Mat}(M \wedge F) \wedge \sim \text{Form}(M \wedge F), w_i) = V(\sim \text{Pred}(M \wedge F), w_i) = 1$, which completes the proof of (1).

The T -validity of (2) follows from that of (1) in view of the fact that $\text{Ban}(A), \text{Form}(A), \text{Mat}(A)$, and $\text{Pred}(A)$ are respectively equivalent to $\text{Ban}(\sim A), \text{Form}(\sim A), \text{Mat}(\sim A)$, and $\text{Pred}(\sim A)$.

In [2] it is proved that if $\text{Pred}(A)$ is an open formula, then $\text{Pred}(A)$ is not acceptable as an axiom. Consequently the author proposes the following formalization of Von Wright's Principle of Predication:

(PP*) *If $\text{Pred}(A)$ is closed then $\text{Pred}(A)$ is valid.*

Now the formulas $\text{Pred}(F \wedge M)$ and $\text{Pred}(F \vee M)$ of the above theorem are closed. It follows that the principle PP* is also unsound.

REFERENCES

- [1] Hughes, G. E. and M. J. Cresswell, *An Introduction to Modal Logic*, Methuen, London 1972.
- [2] Tichy, P., "On de dicto modalities in quantified S5," *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, vol. 2 (1973), pp. 387-392.

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