

## SINGULARITY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC MEASURES<sup>1</sup>

BY

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### 1. Introduction

By a *probability* on a nonempty set  $X$  is meant a finitely additive probability measure defined on all subsets of  $X$ . A *conditional probability* on a nonempty set  $Y$  given  $X$  is a mapping from  $X$  to the set of probabilities on  $Y$ . A *strategy*  $\sigma$  on the cartesian product  $X \times Y$  is a pair  $(\sigma_0, \sigma_1)$  where  $\sigma_0$  is a probability on  $X$  and  $\sigma_1$  is a conditional probability on  $Y$  given  $X$ . Each such strategy  $\sigma$  determines a probability on  $X \times Y$  which is also denoted by  $\sigma$  and is defined by

$$(1.1) \quad \sigma(S) = \int \sigma_1(x)(S_x)\sigma_0(dx)$$

where  $S \subset X \times Y$  and, for each  $x \in X$ ,  $S_x = \{y: (x, y) \in S\}$ . Probabilities which arise from strategies in this fashion are called *strategic*.

For the rest of this note, let  $X = Y = \{1, 2, \dots\}$  and let  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  be probabilities on  $X$ . Define a probability  $\mu$  on  $X \times Y$  by the formula

$$(1.2) \quad \mu(S) = \int \alpha(S^y)\beta(dy)$$

for  $S \subset X \times Y$  and  $S^y = \{x: (x, y) \in S\}$  for every  $y \in Y$ . Notice that  $\mu$  is *reverse strategic* in the sense that it is strategic when the coordinates are interchanged. If  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are countably additive, then  $\mu$  is also strategic as follows from Fubini's Theorem or a general result on the existence of conditional distributions. Our major result states that the situation is quite different for diffuse measures. (A probability  $\alpha$  on  $X$  is *diffuse* or *purely finitely additive* if  $\alpha(\{x\}) = 0$  for every  $x \in X$ .)

**THEOREM.** *If  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are diffuse, then  $\mu$  is singular with respect to every strategic measure.*

Lester Dubins [2] proved this result for the special case when  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  assume only the values 0 and 1, and thereby exhibited the first example of a probability which could not be approximated by strategic measures.

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A probability  $\nu$  on  $X \times Y$  is *nearly strategic* if it lies in the variation norm closure of the strategic measures. The following result is an easy consequence of a theorem of Dubins [2, Proposition 2].

**PROPOSITION.** *If  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$  is countably additive, then  $\mu$  is nearly strategic.*

The converses to both the theorem and the proposition are true. To see this, write

$$\alpha = p\alpha_1 + \bar{p}\alpha_2, \quad \beta = q\beta_1 + \bar{q}\beta_2,$$

where  $p, q \in [0, 1]$ ,  $\bar{p} = 1 - p$ ,  $\bar{q} = 1 - q$ ,  $\alpha_1$  and  $\beta_1$  are countably additive probabilities, and  $\alpha_2$  and  $\beta_2$  diffuse. (To obtain the decomposition for  $\alpha$ , for example, set  $p = \sum_{x \in X} \alpha(\{x\})$  and, for  $A \subset X$ , set

$$\alpha_1(A) = p^{-1} \sum_{x \in A} \alpha(\{x\})$$

if  $p \neq 0$  and let  $\alpha_1$  be an arbitrary countably additive probability if  $p = 0$ .) Let  $\mu_{ij}$  be the probability on  $X \times Y$  defined by formula (1.2) when  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are replaced there by  $\alpha_i$  and  $\beta_j$ , respectively. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \mu &= pq\mu_{11} + p\bar{q}\mu_{12} + \bar{p}q\mu_{21} + \bar{p}\bar{q}\mu_{22} \\ &= (1 - \bar{p}\bar{q})\nu + \bar{p}\bar{q}\mu_{22} \end{aligned}$$

where  $\nu$  is defined by the second equality. By the Theorem,  $\mu_{22}$  is singular with respect to every strategic measure. By the proposition, the remaining  $\mu_{ij}$ 's are nearly strategic and, by a result of Armstrong and Sudderth [1, Theorem 1],  $\nu$ , being a convex combination of nearly strategic measures, is itself nearly strategic. Furthermore, this decomposition of  $\mu$  into nearly strategic and singular parts is essentially unique [1, Corollary 1]. Thus, if  $\mu$  is nearly strategic, then  $\bar{p}\bar{q} = 0$  which proves the converse to the Proposition. Likewise, if  $\mu$  is singular with respect to every strategic measure, then  $\bar{p}\bar{q} = 1$  which proves the converse to the theorem.

The next section presents the proof of the theorem. A final section contains a few remarks and open questions.

## 2. Proof of the theorem

The proof uses a slightly more general notion of strategic measure. Suppose  $\sigma_0$  is a probability on  $X$  and, for every  $x$ ,  $\sigma_1(x)$  is a finitely additive measure defined on all subsets of  $X$  which has total mass less than or equal to one. Then  $(\sigma_0, \sigma_1)$  is a *generalized strategy* and the measure  $\sigma$  of (1.1) is *generalized strategic*.

What will be shown is that given such a  $\sigma$  and given  $\varepsilon > 0$ , there is a set  $S \subset X \times Y$  such that  $\sigma(S) < \varepsilon$  and  $\mu(S) = 1$ . Three cases will be considered.

*Case 1.* For all  $x \in X$ ,  $\sigma_1(x)$  is diffuse.

Take  $S = \{(x, y) : x > y\}$ . It is easy to check that  $\sigma(S) = 0$  and  $\mu(S) = 1$ .

*Case 2.* For all  $x \in X$ ,  $\sigma_1(x)$  is countably additive.

This is the most involved of the three cases and the proof takes several steps. For each  $y \in Y$ , let

$$(2.1) \quad \varepsilon_y = \int \sigma_1(x)(\{y\})\alpha(dx),$$

and set  $Y_1 = \{y: \varepsilon_y = 0\}$ ,  $Y_2 = \{y: \varepsilon_y > 0\}$  so that  $Y$  is the disjoint union of  $Y_1$  with  $Y_2$ . Two sets  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  will be constructed so that for  $i = 1, 2$ ,

$$S_i \subset X \times Y_i, \quad \sigma(S_i) < 2\varepsilon, \quad \mu(S_i) = \mu(X \times Y_i).$$

Then  $S = S_1 \cup S_2$  will satisfy

$$\sigma(S) < 4\varepsilon, \quad \mu(S) = 1,$$

which will complete the proof for this case.

First  $S_1$  will be defined. For each  $y \in Y_1$  and every  $\delta > 0$ ,

$$\alpha\{x: \sigma_1(x)(\{y\}) < \delta\} = 1.$$

Thus, if

$$A_y = \{x: \sigma_1(x)(\{y\}) < \varepsilon/2^y\} \quad \text{and} \quad S_1 = \bigcup_{y \in Y_1} (A_y \times \{y\}),$$

then, for each  $y \in Y_1$ ,  $S_1^y = A_y$  and  $\alpha(S_1^y) = 1$ . Hence,

$$\mu(S_1) = \int_{Y_1} \alpha(S_1^y)\beta(dy) = \beta(Y_1) = \mu(X \times Y_1).$$

However, for every  $x$ , the  $x$ -section  $S_{1,x}$  is

$$\{y \in Y_1: \sigma_1(x)(\{y\}) < \varepsilon/2^y\}$$

which, by the countable additivity of  $\sigma_1(x)$ , has  $\sigma_1(x)$ -measure less than or equal to  $\sum_{y \in Y_1} \varepsilon/2^y < 2\varepsilon$ . Hence,

$$\sigma(S_1) = \int \sigma_1(x)(S_{1,x})\sigma_0(dx) \leq \int 2\varepsilon\sigma_0(dx) = 2\varepsilon.$$

The following lemma is used in the construction of  $S_2$ .

LEMMA.  $\sum_{y \in Y} \varepsilon_y \leq 1$ .

*Proof.* For every  $n \in Y$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{y \leq n} \varepsilon_y &= \int \left\{ \sum_{y \leq n} \sigma_1(x)(\{y\}) \right\} \alpha(dx) \\ &\leq \int \sigma_1(x)(Y)\alpha(dx) \\ &\leq 1. \end{aligned}$$

By the lemma, there is an  $n$  such that

$$(2.2) \quad \sum_{y>n} \varepsilon_y < \varepsilon.$$

Let  $\{K_y, y > n\}$  be a sequence of positive numbers such that

$$(2.3) \quad \lim_{y \rightarrow \infty} K_y = \infty, \quad \sum_{y>n} K_y \varepsilon_y \leq 1.$$

The existence of such a sequence is well known and easy to verify.

If  $\varepsilon_y > 0$ , then

$$(2.4) \quad \alpha(\{x: \sigma_1(x)(\{y\}) \geq \varepsilon_y(1 + K_y \varepsilon)\}) \leq (1 + K_y \varepsilon/2)^{-1}$$

because otherwise, by (2.1),

$$\varepsilon_y \geq \varepsilon_y(1 + K_y \varepsilon)(1 + K_y \varepsilon/2)^{-1} > \varepsilon_y.$$

For each  $y \in Y_2$ , set

$$A_y = \{x: \sigma_1(x)(\{y\}) < \varepsilon_y(1 + K_y \varepsilon)\}.$$

Then, by (2.4), for  $y > n$  and  $y \in Y_2$ ,

$$\alpha(A_y) \geq 1 - (1 + K_y \varepsilon/2)^{-1}$$

and so, by (2.3),

$$(2.5) \quad \alpha(A_y) \rightarrow 1 \quad \text{as } y \rightarrow \infty.$$

Define

$$S_2 = \bigcup_{\substack{y \in Y_2 \\ y > n}} (A_y \times \{y\}).$$

Because of (2.5) and the diffuseness of  $\beta$ ,

$$\mu(S_2) = \int_{Y_2} \alpha(A_y) \beta(dy) = \beta(Y_2) = \mu(X \times Y_2).$$

Also, for each  $x$ , the  $x$ -section  $S_{2,x}$  is

$$\{y \in Y_2: y > n, \sigma_1(x)(\{y\}) < \varepsilon_y(1 + K_y \varepsilon)\},$$

which, by the countable additivity of  $\sigma_1(x)$ , has  $\sigma_1(x)$ -measure less than or equal to

$$\sum_{y>n} \varepsilon_y(1 + K_y \varepsilon) = \sum_{y>n} \varepsilon_y + \varepsilon \sum_{y>n} K_y \varepsilon_y \leq 2\varepsilon,$$

by (2.2) and (2.3). Hence,  $\sigma(S_2) \leq 2\varepsilon$ .

This completes the argument for Case II.

Case 3.  $\sigma_1$  is arbitrary.

For every  $x \in X$  and every  $A \subset X$ , let

$$\sigma_1^c(x)(A) = \sum_{y \in A} \sigma_1(x)(\{y\})$$

and let

$$\sigma_1^d(x)(A) = \sigma_1(x)(A) - \sigma_1^c(x)(A).$$

Thus  $\sigma_1^c(x)$  is countably additive and  $\sigma_1^d(x)$  is diffuse for each  $x$ .

Case I applies to the generalized strategy  $\sigma^d = (\sigma_0, \sigma_1^d)$  to yield  $S_d \subset X \times Y$  such that  $\sigma^d(S_d) < \varepsilon/2$  and  $\mu(S_d) = 1$ . Case II applies to the generalized strategy  $\sigma^c = (\sigma_0, \sigma_1^c)$  to yield  $S_c \subset X \times Y$  such that  $\sigma^c(S_c) < \varepsilon/2$  and  $\mu(S_c) = 1$ .

Set  $S = S_c \cap S_d$ . Then  $\mu(S) = 1$  and

$$\sigma(S) = \sigma^c(S) + \sigma^d(S) \leq \sigma^c(S_c) + \sigma^d(S_d) < \varepsilon.$$

The proof of Theorem 1 is now complete.

### 3. Remarks

One might be misled by the results presented so far to think that reverse strategic measures are strategic only if they are countably additive. Here is a simple counterexample.

*Example.* Write  $X = \bigcup_{n=1}^{\infty} X_n$  where the  $X_n$  are disjoint, infinite sets. For every  $y \in Y$ , let  $\alpha(y)$  be a diffuse probability on  $X_y$ . Define the reverse strategic measure  $\mu$  by

$$(3.1) \quad \mu(S) = \int \alpha(y)(S^y) \beta(dy)$$

for  $S \subset X \times Y$ . Then, as is almost obvious,  $\mu$  is also the measure induced by the strategy  $(\sigma_0, \sigma_1)$  where  $\sigma_0$  is the marginal of  $\mu$  on  $X$  and  $\sigma_1(x)$  is point mass at  $y$  when  $x \in X_y$ .

Additional example of diffuse measures on  $X \times Y$  which are strategic in both directions are in Heath and Sudderth [3, Theorem 3]. However, there is as yet no satisfactory theorem which characterizes those reverse strategic measures which are also strategic.

*Addendum.* Mr. S. Ramakrishnan has pointed out to us that our proposition can be improved to say that, if  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$  is countably additive, then  $\mu$  is strategic. This follows immediately from the fact that, if  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$  is countably additive, then

$$\iint f \, d\alpha \, d\beta = \iint f \, d\beta \, d\alpha$$

for every bounded, real-valued  $f$  defined on  $N \times N$ . This fact is easy to verify; just approximate the countably additive measure by a linear combination of point masses.

## REFERENCES

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