


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## *Editors:*

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## CONTENTS

Introduction. By <i>Michael Detlefsen</i> .....	313
Logical constants across varying types. By <i>Johan van Benthem</i> .....	315
Russell, logicism, and the choice of logical constants. By <i>Michael Byrd</i> .....	343
Logical constants as punctuation marks. By <i>Kosta Došen</i> .....	362
Formatives. By <i>George Englebretsen</i> .....	382
Logical constants and the glory of truth-conditional semantics. By <i>William G. Lycan</i> .....	390
Logical form and radical interpretation. By <i>Tim McCarthy</i> .....	401
The completeness of provable realizability. By <i>G. E. Mints</i> .....	420
Propositional functions and families of types. By <i>Jan M. Smith</i> .....	442
Truth table logic with a survey of embeddability results. By <i>Neil Tennant</i> .....	459

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For the most part, the phenomena with which logic has been concerned throughout its history are marked by a certain “structural” or “formal” character. That is, they are phenomena whose logical characteristics are taken to be due not to the content or subject matter of the expressions involved, but rather to some element of their form or structure. Such linking of logical characteristics with form serves the purpose of *patterning* the logical phenomena of a given language, since forms are things which many different expressions have in common. It also suggests the possibility of finding a kind of form so independent of the content as to be entirely topic-neutral; the nonschematic expressions of these forms would then constitute the “logical constants” of the language.

The linking of logical characteristics with form also leads naturally to a variety of questions. For example: If one of the chief effects of logical structure (or the presence of a logical constant) is the induction of certain patterns of inference, then is it correct to think of any structure which gives rise to a suitably large and varied body of inference patterns as being logical structure (and thus to think of the nonschematic expressions pertaining thereto as logical constants)? Moreover, is it correct to think of “suitably large and varied” as admitting of differences of kind, or only of differences of degree? Similarly, one might ask whether, in naturally occurring languages, there *are* any forms of inference that are so independent of content as to be entirely topic-neutral; and, if so, how one might arrive at a justified opinion of *which* forms of inference these are. Related to, but in certain respects potentially going beyond, all this is the question of *what* logical structure is.

A philosophically satisfying logical theory requires answers to these questions. That no fully satisfying set of such answers has been given is the motive for the present issue. That the work contained herein advances the discussion is its justification.

Michael Detlefsen  
Executive Editor

