

## A Negation-free Proof of Cantor's Theorem

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**Abstract** We construct a novel proof of Cantor's theorem in set theory.

### 1 Introduction

It has been an important endeavor in logic and mathematics to determine whether the proofs of basic theorems can be reformulated without invoking certain kinds of logical primitives. A striking instance of such a reformulation was provided by Yablo's paradox ([1], [2], [3]) which demonstrated that it was possible to construct paradoxical sentences in logic without the need to invoke either direct or indirect self-reference. We carve another such path in this paper by constructing a new proof of Cantor's theorem in set theory without explicitly invoking the negation operation.

Every proof of Cantor's theorem—that for no set there is a function mapping its members onto all its subsets—constructs a subset which is *leftover* by any onto mapping from any set to its powerset. The traditional diagonalization proof involves an explicit invocation of the negation operation in order to define the *leftover* subset. Our new proof of Cantor's theorem, though it uses diagonalization at a certain level, constructs the *leftover* subset without explicitly invoking the negation operation. Further, our proof can also be rewritten in a form which uses negation explicitly.

### 2 Yablo's Paradox

Yablo's paradox ([1], [2], [3]) is a non-self-referential Liar's paradox. Before the formulation of Yablo's paradox, all known paradoxes in logic seemed to require circularity in an unavoidable way. Each of them used either direct self-reference or indirect looplike self-reference. Yablo's paradox demonstrated that self-reference was not a necessary condition for the construction of paradoxical sentences. It can be stated as follows.

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Consider the following infinite sequence of sentences  $S_i$  where the indices ‘ $i, j, k$ ’ range over natural numbers:

$$(S_i) : \text{For all } j > i, S_j \text{ is untrue.}$$

Note that, in the above sequence of statements, each statement quantifies only over statements which occur later in the sequence. Now suppose  $S_k$  is true for some  $k$ . Then  $S_{k+1}$  is false, and so are all subsequent statements. As all subsequent statements are false,  $S_{k+1}$  is true, which is a contradiction. So  $S_k$  is false for all  $k$ . Looking at any particular  $i$ , this in turn means that  $S_i$  in fact holds, which is a contradiction.

### 3 New Proof of Cantor’s Theorem

**Theorem 3.1 (Cantor’s Theorem)** *The cardinality of the power set of a set  $X$  exceeds the cardinality of  $X$ , and in particular the continuum is uncountable.*

**Proof** Let  $X$  be any set, and  $P(X)$  denote the power set of  $X$ . Assume that it is possible to define a one-to-one mapping  $M : X \leftrightarrow P(X)$ .

Define  $s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots$  to be a trace, where the first element of the trace is any arbitrary  $s_0 \in X$ , and all further elements  $s_j$ , where  $j > 0$ , of the trace are such that  $s_j \in M(s_{j-1})$ . Define  $t \in X$  to be a simple element, if all possible traces beginning with  $t$  terminate. Note that a trace  $s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots, s_f$  terminates at  $s_f$  if  $M(s_f)$  is the empty set. Define  $N = \{t \in X \mid t \text{ is a simple element}\}$ .

The set  $N$ , which is a subset of  $X$ , cannot lie in the range of  $M$ . Suppose there exists an  $n \in X$  such that  $M(n) = N$ , then  $n$  should be a simple element since all traces beginning with element  $n$  also terminate. Thus  $n \in N$ , but then  $n$  is no longer a simple element, since not all traces beginning with  $n$  are terminating traces (e.g., “ $n, n, n, \dots$ ” is one such nonterminating trace). Thus the set  $N$  is out of the range of mapping  $M$ .  $\square$

In the above novel proof of Cantor’s theorem, the construction of the set  $N$  does not require explicit negation. This is unlike the standard diagonalization proof which invokes the operation of negation in order to construct the *leftover* subset. Of course, one could say the same of the usual diagonal argument showing that the reals are uncountable, because the process of swapping 0s and 1s in the binary expansion of a real number need not be thought of as negation. Also, it is possible to rewrite the above proof in a slightly different way and bring out negation explicitly. This can be done by changing the definition of a simple element as one whose traces do not continue indefinitely.

### References

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