# AN UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM CONCERNING IMPLICATIONAL CALCULI 

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Propositional calculi are assumed to be defined as in Harrop [2]. A propositional calculus is called implicational if it has exactly one connective and that a binary one. Algebraic structures called finite models of a propositional calculus $\mathbf{P}$ in Harrop [2] will be called here finite rulemodels of $\mathbf{P}$. An algebraic structure of the appropriate kind is called a model of $\mathbf{P}$ if every theorem of $\mathbf{P}$ is valid in it. We note that every finite rule-model of $\mathbf{P}$ is a finite model of $\mathbf{P}$, but the converse need not hold. It is proved in Harrop [2] (lemma 3.1, pp. 5-6) that there is an effective method for deciding whether or not a finite algebraic structure is a finite rule-model of a propositional calculus $\mathbf{P}$. We prove here the following:

Theorem. There is no effective method for deciding whether or not a finite algebraic structure is a model of an arbitrary subcalculus (with modus ponens as its only rule of inference) of the classical implicational calculus.

We first prove a lemma which is of some independent interest.
Lemma. For every wff $\alpha$ there is a finite algebraic structure $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ such that for any wff $\beta, \beta$ is invalid in $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ if and only if $\alpha$ is a substitution instance of $\beta$.

Proof. If $\delta$ is a wff all of whose propositional variables are given without repetition in the list $v_{1}, v_{2}, \ldots, v_{k}$, then $\delta$ is also written as $\delta\left(v_{1}, v_{2}, \ldots, v_{k}\right)$. Let $\alpha\left(v_{1}, v_{2}, \ldots, v_{s}\right)$ be given, and let the set of all subformulas of $\alpha$ be listed in the sequence $\gamma_{1}, \gamma_{2}, \ldots, \gamma_{s}, \gamma_{s+1}, \ldots, \gamma_{s+m}$ such that $\gamma_{i}=v_{i}, i=$ $1,2, \ldots, s$ and no $\gamma_{j}$ is a subformula of any of its predecessors in the above sequence. For example, if $\alpha$ is $C C p q C N q N p$ then a desired sequence of subformulas of $\alpha$ is: $p, q, N p, N q, C p q, C N q N p, C C p q C N q N p$.

Based on the construction of $\alpha$ we define the finite algebraic structure $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$. Let $S=\{0,1,2, \ldots, s+m\}$, and $D=S-\{s+m\}$ be the set of designated elements of $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$. If $\Omega^{*}$ is the set of all propositional connectives, then corresponding to each $k$-ary $\omega^{*} \varepsilon \Omega^{*}$ we define a distinct $k$-ary operation $\omega$ on $S$ as follows: For any $k$-tuple $i_{1}, i_{2}, \ldots, i_{k}$ of elements of $S$, $\omega\left(i_{1}, i_{2}, \ldots, i_{k}\right)=j$, if there is a subformula $\gamma_{j}$ of $\alpha$ such that

$$
\gamma_{j}=\omega^{*}\left(\gamma_{i_{1}}, \gamma_{i_{2}}, \ldots, \gamma_{i_{k}}\right) ; \text { otherwise } \omega\left(i_{1}, i_{2}, \ldots, i_{k}\right)=0
$$

For the example $C C p q C N q N p, s=2, m=5$ and the operations $N$ and $C$ defined on the set $\{0,1,2, \ldots, 7\}$ are:

$$
\begin{gathered}
N(1)=3, N(2)=4, N(x)=0 \text { otherwise; } \\
C(1,2)=5, C(4,3)=6, C(5,6)=7, C(x, y)=0 \text { otherwise. }
\end{gathered}
$$

Clearly, $\alpha\left(v_{1}, v_{2}, \ldots, v_{s}\right)$ is invalid in $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$, because $\alpha$ takes the value $s+m$ when $v_{i}=i, i=1,2, \ldots, s$. Hence, any wff $\beta$ of which $\alpha$ is a substitution instance is also invalid in $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$. Before proving that if $\beta$ is invalid in $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$, then $\alpha$ is a substitution instance of $\beta$ we note the following properties of $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$.
(1). The elements $1,2, \ldots, s$ are not in the range of any operation $\omega \varepsilon \Omega$.
(2). For any $j \varepsilon S$ and $s<j$, there is a unique $k$-ary operation $\omega \varepsilon \Omega$ and a unique $k$-tuple of elements from $S$ such that $\omega$ takes the value $j$ for this $k$-tuple.
(3). For each $j \varepsilon S$ and $s<j, j$ has a unique factorization using only elements from the set $\{1,2, \ldots, s\}$ and operations from $\Omega$.
(4). For each $\omega \varepsilon \Omega, \omega(\ldots, 0, \ldots)=0$.

Let $\beta\left(u_{1}, u_{2}, \ldots, u_{n}\right)$ be invalid in $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$. Then, there is an invalidating assignment to the variables of $\beta$ from the set $\{1,2, \ldots, s+m\}$ (see property (4) of $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ ) such that $\beta$ takes the value $s+m$ for this assignment. Let $u_{i}$ take the value $j_{i}$ for this assignment, $i=1,2, \ldots, n$. Let $\delta=\beta\left(u_{1} / \gamma_{i_{1}}, u_{2} / \gamma_{j_{2}}, \ldots, u_{n} / \gamma_{j_{n}}\right)$. Since each $\gamma_{i}$ is a subformula of $\alpha$ and $\gamma_{i}$ takes the value $i$ when $v_{t}$ takes the value $t, t=1,2, \ldots, s, \delta$ takes the value $s+m$ when $v_{t}$ takes the value $t, t=1,2, \ldots, s$. In view of property (3) of $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$, $\delta$ must be $\alpha$. For our example $C C p q C N q N p$, if $\beta$ were $C u_{1} C N u_{2} u_{3}$ then the invalidating assignment gives $5,2,3$ respectively to $u_{1}, u_{2}$, and $u_{3}$. Substituting the fifth, the second and the third subformulas of $C C p q C N q N p$ in the previously given list for $u_{1}, u_{2}$, and $u_{3}$ respectively in $\beta$ we get CCpqCNqNp.

Remark. A rule of inference is called non-trivial if it has some application for which the conclusion is not a substitution instance of any of the premises of that application. No non-trivial rule of inference is satisfied by every $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$.

Proof of the Theorem. Assume it is false. Let $\mathbf{P}$ be an implicational calculus (all of whose theorems are classical tautologies) with modus ponens as the only rule of inference. Let $\alpha$ be any wff with implication as its only connective. Consider $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$. By assumption we can decide whether or not $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ is a model of $\mathbf{P}$. If $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ is a model of $\mathbf{P}$ then $\alpha$ is not a theorem of $\mathbf{P}$ by the construction of $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$. If $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ is not a model of $\mathbf{P}$, then some theorem of $\mathbf{P}$ must be invalid in $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$. Thus, by the lemma, $\alpha$ is a substitution instance of a theorem of $\mathbf{P}$ and hence $\alpha$ is itself a theorem of $\mathbf{P}$. Therefore, $\mathbf{P}$ is decidable. This contradicts theorem 1 of Gladstone [1].

## REFERENCES

[1] Gladstone, M. D., "Some ways of constructing a propositional calculus of any required degree of unsolvability," Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 124 (1965), pp. 192-210.
[2] Harrop, R., "On the existence of finite models and decision procedures for propositional calculi," Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, vol. 54 (1958), pp. 1-13.

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