Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic Volume XI, Number 2, April 1970

## AN UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM CONCERNING IMPLICATIONAL CALCULI

## BISWAMBHAR PAHI and RALPH C. APPLEBEE

Propositional calculi are assumed to be defined as in Harrop [2]. A propositional calculus is called implicational if it has exactly one connective and that a binary one. Algebraic structures called finite models of a propositional calculus  $\mathbf{P}$  in Harrop [2] will be called here *finite rule-models* of  $\mathbf{P}$ . An algebraic structure of the appropriate kind is called a *model* of  $\mathbf{P}$  if every theorem of  $\mathbf{P}$  is valid in it. We note that every finite rule-model of  $\mathbf{P}$  is a finite model of  $\mathbf{P}$ , but the converse need not hold. It is proved in Harrop [2] (lemma 3.1, pp. 5-6) that there is an effective method for deciding whether or not a finite algebraic structure is a finite rule-model of a propositional calculus  $\mathbf{P}$ . We prove here the following:

Theorem. There is no effective method for deciding whether or not a finite algebraic structure is a model of an arbitrary subcalculus (with modus ponens as its only rule of inference) of the classical implicational calculus.

We first prove a lemma which is of some independent interest.

Lemma. For every wff  $\alpha$  there is a finite algebraic structure  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$  such that for any wff  $\beta$ ,  $\beta$  is invalid in  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$  if and only if  $\alpha$  is a substitution instance of  $\beta$ .

*Proof.* If  $\delta$  is a wff all of whose propositional variables are given without repetition in the list  $v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_k$ , then  $\delta$  is also written as  $\delta(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_k)$ . Let  $\alpha(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_s)$  be given, and let the set of all subformulas of  $\alpha$  be listed in the sequence  $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \ldots, \gamma_s, \gamma_{s+1}, \ldots, \gamma_{s+m}$  such that  $\gamma_i = v_i, i = 1, 2, \ldots, s$  and no  $\gamma_i$  is a subformula of any of its predecessors in the above sequence. For example, if  $\alpha$  is CCpqCNqNp then a desired sequence of subformulas of  $\alpha$  is: p, q, Np, Nq, Cpq, CNqNp, CCpqCNqNp.

Based on the construction of  $\alpha$  we define the finite algebraic structure  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ . Let  $S = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, s + m\}$ , and  $D = S - \{s + m\}$  be the set of designated elements of  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ . If  $\Omega^*$  is the set of all propositional connectives, then corresponding to each k-ary  $\omega^* \varepsilon \Omega^*$  we define a distinct k-ary operation  $\omega$  on S as follows: For any k-tuple  $i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_k$  of elements of S,  $\omega(i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_k) = j$ , if there is a subformula  $\gamma_j$  of  $\alpha$  such that

Received March 4, 1969

200

$$\gamma_i = \omega^*(\gamma_{i_1}, \gamma_{i_2}, \ldots, \gamma_{i_k});$$
 otherwise  $\omega(i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_k) = 0.$ 

For the example CCpqCNqNp, s = 2, m = 5 and the operations N and C defined on the set  $\{0, 1, 2, \ldots, 7\}$  are:

$$N(1) = 3, N(2) = 4, N(x) = 0$$
 otherwise;  
 $C(1, 2) = 5, C(4, 3) = 6, C(5, 6) = 7, C(x, y) = 0$  otherwise.

Clearly,  $\alpha(v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_s)$  is invalid in  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ , because  $\alpha$  takes the value s + m when  $v_i = i, i = 1, 2, \ldots, s$ . Hence, any wff  $\beta$  of which  $\alpha$  is a substitution instance is also invalid in  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ . Before proving that if  $\beta$  is invalid in  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ , then  $\alpha$  is a substitution instance of  $\beta$  we note the following properties of  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ .

(1). The elements  $1, 2, \ldots, s$  are not in the range of any operation  $\omega \varepsilon \Omega$ .

(2). For any  $j \in S$  and s < j, there is a unique k-ary operation  $\omega \in \Omega$  and a unique k-tuple of elements from S such that  $\omega$  takes the value j for this k-tuple.

(3). For each  $j \in S$  and s < j, j has a unique factorization using only elements from the set  $\{1, 2, \ldots, s\}$  and operations from  $\Omega$ .

(4). For each  $\omega \varepsilon \Omega$ ,  $\omega(\ldots, 0, \ldots) = 0$ .

Let  $\beta(u_1, u_2, \ldots, u_n)$  be invalid in  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ . Then, there is an invalidating assignment to the variables of  $\beta$  from the set  $\{1, 2, \ldots, s + m\}$  (see property (4) of  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ ) such that  $\beta$  takes the value s + m for this assignment. Let  $u_i$  take the value  $j_i$  for this assignment,  $i = 1, 2, \ldots, n$ . Let  $\delta = \beta(u_1/\gamma_{j_1}, u_2/\gamma_{j_2}, \ldots, u_n/\gamma_{j_n})$ . Since each  $\gamma_i$  is a subformula of  $\alpha$  and  $\gamma_i$ takes the value *i* when  $v_t$  takes the value *t*,  $t = 1, 2, \ldots, s$ ,  $\delta$  takes the value s + m when  $v_t$  takes the value *t*,  $t = 1, 2, \ldots, s$ . In view of property (3) of  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ ,  $\delta$  must be  $\alpha$ . For our example CCpqCNqNp, if  $\beta$  were  $Cu_1CNu_2u_3$ then the invalidating assignment gives 5, 2, 3 respectively to  $u_1, u_2$ , and  $u_3$ . Substituting the fifth, the second and the third subformulas of CCpqCNqNpin the previously given list for  $u_1, u_2$ , and  $u_3$  respectively in  $\beta$  we get CCpqCNqNp.

*Remark*. A rule of inference is called non-trivial if it has some application for which the conclusion is not a substitution instance of any of the premises of that application. No non-trivial rule of inference is satisfied by every  $M_{\alpha}$ .

Proof of the Theorem. Assume it is false. Let **P** be an implicational calculus (all of whose theorems are classical tautologies) with modus ponens as the only rule of inference. Let  $\alpha$  be any wff with implication as its only connective. Consider  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ . By assumption we can decide whether or not  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$  is a model of **P**. If  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$  is a model of **P** then  $\alpha$  is not a theorem of **P** by the construction of  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ . If  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$  is not a model of **P**, then some theorem of **P** must be invalid in  $\mathbf{M}_{\alpha}$ . Thus, by the lemma,  $\alpha$  is a substitution instance of a theorem of **P** and hence  $\alpha$  is itself a theorem of **P**. Therefore, **P** is decidable. This contradicts theorem 1 of Gladstone [1].

## BISWAMBHAR PAHI and RALPH C. APPLEBEE

## REFERENCES

- Gladstone, M. D., "Some ways of constructing a propositional calculus of any required degree of unsolvability," *Transactions of the American Mathematical* Society, vol. 124 (1965), pp. 192-210.
- [2] Harrop, R., "On the existence of finite models and decision procedures for propositional calculi," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, vol. 54 (1958), pp. 1-13.

Central Washington State College Ellensburg, Washington