# On the Freyd Cover of a Topos 

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A theory is said to have the disjunction-property $(D P)$ if whenever a disjunction $\phi \vee \psi$ is provable in the theory, either $\phi$ or $\psi$ must be provable. As is well-known, many theories for intuitionistic arithmetic and analysis have the $D P$. The $D P$ for intuitionistic type theory was first established by Friedman. More recently, a purely topos theoretic proof has been given by Freyd. An extensive discussion of both methods can be found in [4]. Although Freyd's construction is much more elegant, A. Sčedrov and P. Scott have shown that the two methods are essentially the same in [7].

A question that arises immediately is the following: If one adds new symbols and a particular set of axioms $T$ to the logical axioms and rules, does the resulting higher-order theory still have the $D P$ ? Some instances of this question in which $T$ consists of a single axiom have been considered in [5]. In this note, we will obtain a syntactic description of a class of theories that have the $D P$ by investigating some of the logical properties of the Freyd cover, thus extending the results of [5].

The results will not cover many of the higher-order analogues of theories of intuitionistic arithmetic and analysis which are known to have the $D P$. One reason for this is that, from a more logical point of view, the Freyd cover lacks many nice properties. For an alternative type of cover that fills this gap, the reader is referred to [6].

In the first section of this paper, we will motivate the Freyd cover from a more logical perspective. There is probably nothing new in this, but it still is important to realize that what is really going on is a straightforward generalization of more traditional methods used in the model theory of first-order

[^0]intuitionistic logic. Thus, the above-mentioned result of $\check{\text { Šcedrov and Scott }}$ should not come as a surprise. This perspective also opens the way to connections with, for example, (higher-order analogues of) the Aczel-slash, and the Kleene-slash (see [8]).

In the second section, we examine preservation-properties of the Freyd cover, and prove the main result.

1 Motivating the Freyd cover Everybody knows how to prove the disjunction property for intuitionistic propositional logic (or Heyting's Arithmetic, etc.): If $\phi$ and $\psi$ are two nonprovable formulas, just take two Kripke models $K_{1} \nexists \phi$ and $K_{2} \not \nexists \psi$, and add a new bottom node (this operator on Kripke models is called the Smorynski operator).


Then the bottom node cannot force $\phi \vee \psi$, so $\phi \vee \psi$ is not provable either (for details, see [8]).

Looking at this topologically, what we did was take two sheaf-models over spaces $X_{1}$ and $X_{2}$, take their topological sum $X_{1}+X_{2}$, and define a new space $X=\left(X_{1}+X_{2}\right) \cup\{*\}$, where $* \notin X_{1}+X_{2}$ is a closed point of $X$ whose only neighbourhood is the whole space $X$.

But this is precisely the situation for applying the theorem of Artin glueing [2], which says that you can get $\operatorname{Sh}(X)$, the category of sheaves over $X$, by glueing along the global sections functor $\Gamma$,

$$
\operatorname{Sh}\left(X_{1}+X_{2}\right) \cong \operatorname{Sh}\left(X_{1}\right) \times \operatorname{Sh}\left(X_{2}\right) \xrightarrow{\Gamma} \operatorname{Sets} \cong \operatorname{Sh}(*) .
$$

This is easily generalized for topoi, using the elementary form of Artin glueing ([3], Section 4.2): Given two topoi $\varepsilon_{1}$ and $\varepsilon_{2}$, let $\varepsilon_{1} \times \varepsilon_{2} \rightarrow$ Sets be the global sections-functor ( $1,-$ ), and glue along $\Gamma$, i.e., make the comma category (Sets $\downarrow \Gamma$ ). This topos (Sets $\downarrow \Gamma$ ) is the Freyd cover of $\varepsilon_{1} \times \varepsilon_{2}$, and will be denoted by $\varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2}$. Objects of this topos are triples $(X, E, \phi)$, where $X$ is a set, $E=\left(E_{1}, E_{2}\right)$ is an object of $\varepsilon_{1} \times \varepsilon_{2}$, and $\phi$ is a function $X \rightarrow \Gamma E$. Recall (see [9]) that we have a geometric morphism

$$
\varepsilon_{1} \times \varepsilon_{2} \rightarrow \varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2}
$$

with inverse image the forgetful functor $\varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2} \xrightarrow{U} \varepsilon_{1} \times \varepsilon_{2}, U(X, E, \phi)=E$, and with direct image the cofree coalgebra functor $\varepsilon_{1} \times \varepsilon_{2} \xrightarrow{G} \varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2}, G E=$ ( $\Gamma E, E, i d_{\Gamma E}$ ). This geometric morphism is an open inclusion, so $U$ is logical, and $G$ preserves exponents.

We now want to reason as in the case of the Smorynski operator, roughly as follows: given two nonprovable formulas $\phi$ and $\psi$ of intuitionistic higherorder logic, find topoi $\varepsilon_{1}$ and $\varepsilon_{2}$ with interpretations $\ell_{1}$ in $\varepsilon_{1}$ and $\ell_{2}$ in $\varepsilon_{2}$
such that $\varepsilon \underset{\Omega_{1}}{\neq} \phi$ and $\varepsilon_{2} \underset{d_{2}}{\neq} \psi$. Then the product $d=d_{1} \times d_{2}$ is an interpretation in $\varepsilon_{1} \times \varepsilon_{2}$ such that $\varepsilon_{1} \times \varepsilon_{2} \not \forall_{d} \phi$ and $\varepsilon_{1} \times \varepsilon_{2} \forall_{d} \psi$. We now want to transport this interpretation $d$ along $G$ and obtain an interpretation $\bar{d}$ in $\varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2}$ with the property that $U \circ \frac{d}{d}=d$. Since $U$ is logical (and therefore preserves validity), $\varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2} \underset{-l}{\neq} \phi$ and $\varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2} \underset{\frac{Z}{l}}{\neq} \psi$. From a simple inspection of the subobject-classifier in the comma-topos $\varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2}$ (the terminal object in $\varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2}$ is indecomposable, see [5]) it then follows that $\varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2} \not{\underset{g}{l}}_{\neq} \phi \vee \psi$. Below, we will discuss the problem of
(1) how to make $\bar{d}$ out of $\ell$ ?

Often, one starts with a theory $T$ and two nonprovable formulas $T H \phi$ and $T H \psi$, and finds $\varepsilon_{1}, l_{1}$ and $\varepsilon_{2}, \ell_{2}$ such that $\varepsilon_{1} F_{l_{1}} T$ and $\varepsilon_{2} \xi_{l_{2}} T$, $\mathcal{E}_{2} \underset{\ell_{1}}{\neq} \phi, \mathcal{E}_{1} \underset{\ell_{2}}{\neq} \psi$. To show that $T$ has the $D P$, one then wants $\mathcal{E}_{1} * \mathcal{E}_{2}$ to be a model of $T$ under the interpretation $\bar{\ell}$, too. So we want to know
(2) for which theories $T$ does it hold that whenever $\left(\varepsilon_{1}, \ell_{1}\right)$ and $\left(\varepsilon_{2}, \ell_{2}\right)$ are models of $T$, so is $\left(\varepsilon_{1} * \varepsilon_{2}, \bar{d}\right)$ ?
(1) and (2) will be dealt with in the next section.

But before we turn to this, let us be more explicit about interpretations. We take a version of higher-order logic of the kind described in [1], which is sound and complete for interpretations in topoi. The language has two ingredients: sorts and constants. We have a set of ground sorts $\left\{s_{i} \mid i \epsilon I\right\}$, from which we can build up the set of sorts inductively: every groundsort is a sort, and if $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}, t$ are sorts, $\left[s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}\right]$ is a sort (the sort of $n$-place relations taking arguments of sorts $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}$, respectively), and $\left[s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} \rightarrow t\right]$ is a sort (the sort of functions taking $n$ arguments of sorts $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}$, respectively, to a value of sort $t$ ). We also have a set of constants $\left\{c_{j} \mid j \in J\right\}$, together with an assignment $c \mapsto \#(c)$ of a sort to each constant. An interpretation $d$ of the language in a topos $\varepsilon$ assigns to each groundsort an object $\ell(s)$ of $\mathcal{E} ; \mathbb{d}$ is then extended to all sorts by setting

$$
\begin{aligned}
\ell\left(\left[s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}\right]\right) & =\Omega^{\ell\left(s_{1}\right) \times \ldots \times \ell\left(s_{n}\right) ;} \\
d\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n} \rightarrow t\right) & =d(t)^{\ell\left(s_{1}\right) \times \ldots \times \ell\left(s_{n}\right)} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Further, $\ell d$ assigns an arrow $\ell(c): 1 \rightarrow \ell(\# c)$ to each constant $c$. The interpretation of terms and formulas is then defined in the standard way (see, e.g., [1]).

Note that abstraction terms (terms of the form $\left\{\left\langle x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right\rangle \mid \phi\right\}$ ) are eliminable in formulas. Therefore we will in the sequel assume that formulas do not contain abstraction terms.

Below, we will use the word term only in the following sense: variables and constants are terms, and if $\sigma_{1}, \ldots, \sigma_{n}$ are terms and $f$ is a functional term of the appropriate sort, $f\left(\sigma_{1}, \ldots, \sigma_{n}\right)$ is a term. Thus, no quantifiers, connectives, or abstraction $(\{\cdot \mid \cdot\})$ can occur in terms. Note that every formula of the higher-order language is equivalent to one which is built up from atomic formulas of the form $R\left(\sigma_{1}, \ldots, \sigma_{n}\right)$ or $\sigma_{1}=\sigma_{2}$, where $\sigma_{1}, \ldots, \sigma_{n}$ are terms in this sense and $R$ is a relational term in this sense, by the usual clauses for the
quantifiers and connectives. It is important to be explicit about this, as will appear in the sequel.

2 Preservation properties of the Freyd cover We consider a slightly more general situation: let $\mathcal{E}$ and $\mathscr{F}$ be topoi, and let $\mathcal{E} \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{F}$ be a left-exact functor. We then have a geometric morphism $\mathcal{E} \rightarrow(\mathscr{F} \downarrow d)$ given by the forgetful functor $U:(\mathscr{F} \downarrow d) \rightarrow \varepsilon$ and the cofree coalgebra functor $G: \varepsilon \rightarrow(\mathscr{F} \downarrow d)$; $U$ is logical, $G$ preserves exponents, and $U \circ G=i d_{\varepsilon}$. Suppose that we have an interpretation $\ell$ of the logical language in $\varepsilon$. We want to construct an interpretation $\bar{\ell}$ in $(\mathscr{F} \downarrow d)$ (cf. (1) above).

First note that $G \Omega_{\mathcal{E}}$ is a retract of $\Omega_{(\mathscr{F} \downarrow)}$ : the classifying morphism $G \Omega_{\mathcal{E}} \xrightarrow{\rho} \Omega_{(\mathcal{F} \downarrow d)}$ of Gtrue: $1 \simeq G 1 \rightarrow G \Omega_{\mathcal{E}}$ is splitmono, with splitting $\Omega_{(\mathscr{F} \downarrow d)} \xrightarrow{\lambda}$ $G \Omega_{\varepsilon}$ (the transpose of $U \Omega_{\mathcal{F} \downarrow d} \stackrel{\widetilde{ }}{\rightarrow} \Omega_{\mathcal{E}}$ ).

For a groundsort $s$ we define an object $\bar{d}(s)$ of $(\mathscr{F} \downarrow d)$ by

$$
\bar{l}(s)=G_{\ell} \ell(s)
$$

$\bar{d}$ is then uniquely (up to isomorphism) extended to all sorts. We then construct by induction on the sort $s$ morphisms $k_{s}$ and $e_{s}$

$$
G \ell(s) \xrightarrow{k_{s}} \overline{\mathrm{I}}(s) \xrightarrow{e_{S}} G \ell(s)
$$

with $e_{s} \circ k_{s}=1_{G \ell(s)}$, and $U\left(k_{s}\right)=U\left(e_{s}\right)=1_{\ell(s)}$. If $s$ is a groundsort, then $k_{s}=$ $e_{s}=1_{G \ell(s)}$. If $s=\left[t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n}\right]$, and we have defined $k_{t_{i}}$ and $e_{t_{i}}(i=1, \ldots, n)$, then $k_{s}$ and $e_{s}$ are defined as the compositions

$$
\rho^{\bar{\jmath}\left(t_{1}\right) \times \ldots \times \bar{\ell}\left(t_{n}\right)} \circ G \Omega_{\varepsilon_{1}}^{e_{t_{1}} \times \ldots \times e_{t_{n}}}
$$

and

$$
\lambda^{G \ell\left(t_{1}\right) \times \ldots \times G \ell\left(t_{n}\right)} \circ \Omega_{(\xi \downarrow d)}^{k_{t_{1}} \times \ldots \times k_{t_{n}}}
$$

If $s=\left[t_{1}, \ldots, t_{n} \rightarrow r\right]$, and we have defined $k_{t_{i}}, e_{t_{i}}(i=1, \ldots, n), k_{r}, e_{r}$, then $k_{s}$ and $e_{s}$ are the following two compositions

$$
d(r)^{e_{t_{1}} \times \ldots \times e_{t_{n}} \circ k_{r}^{G \ell\left(t_{1}\right) \times \ldots \times G \ell\left(t_{n}\right)}, ~\left(\frac{1}{}\right)}
$$

and

$$
G \ell(t)^{k_{t_{1}} \times \ldots \times k_{n}} \circ e_{r}^{\bar{\ell}\left(t_{1}\right) \times \ldots \times \bar{\ell}\left(t_{n}\right)}
$$

$\bar{d}$ is then defined for constants as follows: if $\# c=s$, then

$$
\bar{d}(c)=1 \simeq G 1 \xrightarrow{G \ell(c)} G \ell(s) \xrightarrow{k_{s}} \bar{\ell}(s) .
$$

This completes the definition of $\bar{\ell}$. Note that $U \circ \bar{\ell}=\ell$. Since $U$ is logical, we immediately have
2.1 Lemma Let $\phi$ be an arbitrary formula, with free variables among $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}$. Then

$$
U\left(\llbracket \phi \rrbracket_{\ell}>\prod_{i=1}^{n} \ell\left(\# x_{i}\right)\right)=\left(\llbracket \phi \rrbracket_{\ell}>\prod_{i=1}^{n} \ell\left(\# x_{i}\right)\right)
$$

and similarly for terms.

For an atomic formula $R\left(\tau_{1}, \ldots, \tau_{n}\right)$, where $R$ is a relational constant, and $\tau_{1}, \ldots, \tau_{n}$ are terms (recall the convention at the end of Section 1) with free variables among $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{k}$, and $\ell\left(\# x_{i}\right)=A_{i}, \llbracket R\left(\tau_{1}, \ldots, \tau_{n}\right) \rrbracket_{d}$ defines a subobject of $A_{1} \times \ldots \times A_{k}$ in $\mathcal{E}$, or a morphism $A_{1} \times \ldots \times A_{k} \rightarrow \Omega$, or $1 \rightarrow$ $\Omega^{A_{1} \times \ldots \times A_{k}}$. Now what is $\llbracket R\left(\tau_{1}, \ldots, \tau_{n}\right) \rrbracket_{\bar{\ell}}$ in $(\sigma \downarrow d)$ ? We will show that the association
(1) $\llbracket R\left(\tau_{1}, \ldots, \tau_{n}\right) \rrbracket_{\ell} \mapsto \llbracket R\left(\tau_{1}, \ldots, \tau_{n}\right) \rrbracket_{\mathscr{\ell}}$
corresponds to the following operation on subobjects
(2) $\Phi: \mathcal{E}(A, \Omega) \rightarrow(F \downarrow d)(\bar{A}, \Omega)$
(here $A=\ell\left(s_{1}\right) \times \ldots \times \operatorname{l}\left(s_{k}\right), \bar{A}=\bar{l}\left(s_{1}\right) \times \ldots \times \bar{d}\left(s_{k}\right)$, for suitable $\left.s_{1}, \ldots, s_{k}\right)$ : $\Phi$ associates with $1 \stackrel{t}{\rightarrow} \Omega^{A}$ the composition

$$
1 \simeq G 1 \xrightarrow{G f}\left(\Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{k} \Omega^{\bar{A}}
$$

where $k$ is the splitmono for $\left[s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}\right.$ ]. (In the sequel, we will usually omit the indices on the morphisms $k_{s}$ and $e_{s}$.)

For the proof that (1) is the same as (2), first observe that for any term $\sigma$ with free variables among $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n},\left(l\left(\# x_{i}\right)=A, \bar{l}\left(\# x_{i}\right)=\bar{A}, k_{A_{i}}=k_{\# x_{i}}\right)$ the following diagram commutes (the proof is an easy induction on $\sigma$ ):

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \bar{A}_{1} \times \ldots \times \bar{A} \xrightarrow{\llbracket \sigma \rrbracket_{\mathscr{\ell}}} \bar{B} \\
& \uparrow k_{A_{1}} \times \ldots \times k_{A_{n}} \mid k_{B} \\
& G A_{1} \times \ldots \times G A_{n} \xrightarrow{\llbracket \sigma \rrbracket_{\ell}} G B
\end{aligned}
$$

Now suppose for ease of notation that $R$ is a one-place relational constant, say with $\ell(R): 1 \rightarrow \Omega_{\mathscr{E}}^{B}$, and write $\ell(\sigma): 1 \rightarrow B^{A}$ for the transpose of $\llbracket \sigma \rrbracket_{\ell}: A \rightarrow B$. Then the claim that

$$
\Phi\left(\llbracket R(\sigma) \rrbracket_{\ell}\right)=\llbracket R(\sigma) \rrbracket_{\bar{\ell}}
$$

follows easily, if we can show that the following compositions (i) and (ii) are identical:
(i) $\bar{A} \xrightarrow{\underline{B} \times G \ell(\sigma)} \bar{A} \times G\left(B^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{1 \times k} \bar{A} \times \bar{B}^{\bar{A}} \xrightarrow{e v} \bar{B} \xrightarrow{1 \times G \ell(R)} \bar{B} \times G\left(\Omega_{\mathcal{E}}^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{1 \times k} B \times$ $\Omega_{\sigma \downarrow d}^{\bar{B}} \xrightarrow{e v} \Omega_{\mathcal{F} \downarrow d}$
(ii) $\bar{A} \xrightarrow{1 \times G_{\ell(R)}} \bar{A} \times G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{1 \times G\left(\Omega^{\left.\|\sigma\|_{\ell}\right)}\right.} \bar{A} \times G\left(\Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{1 \times k} \bar{A} \times \Omega^{\bar{A}} \xrightarrow{e \nu} \Omega$.

But from the definition of $k$ it follows that (1) is identical to

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \bar{A} \xrightarrow{1 \times G \ell(\sigma)} \bar{A} \times G\left(B^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{e \times 1} G A \times G\left(B^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{G e v} G B \xrightarrow{k} \bar{B} \xrightarrow{1 \times G \ell(R)} \bar{B} \times G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \\
& \xrightarrow{e \times 1} G B \times G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{G e v} G \Omega \xrightarrow{\rho} \Omega
\end{aligned}
$$

and since $e \circ k=i d$, this is identical to

$$
\bar{A} \xrightarrow{e} G A \xrightarrow{1 \times G \ell(\sigma)} G A \times G\left(B^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{G e v} G B \xrightarrow{1 \times G \ell(R)} G B \times G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{G e v} G \Omega \xrightarrow{\rho} \Omega .
$$

Similarly, one shows that (2) is identical to

$$
\bar{A} \xrightarrow{\underline{1 \times G \ell(R)}} \bar{A} \times G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{e \times_{1}} G A \times G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{G \llbracket \sigma \|_{\ell} \times 1} G B \times G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{G e v} G \Omega \xrightarrow{\rho} \Omega .
$$

And clearly, the latter two compositions are identical, since $d(\sigma)$ is the transpose of $\llbracket \sigma \rrbracket_{\ell}$. As is easily seen, this proves the correspondence of (1) and (2) not only for $R$ a single constant, but also more generally for $R$ a term without variables (i.e., $R$ built up from constants by functional application only).

Let us now turn to the properties of the operation $\Phi$. First a notational convention: a subobject of $A$ is either represented by a mono $B \rightarrow A$, or its classifying morphism $A \xrightarrow{f} \Omega$, or its transpose $1 \xrightarrow{\hat{f}} \Omega^{A}$. In all these cases we will write $\Phi(B), \Phi(f), \Phi(\hat{f})$ for the corresponding representation of the subobject given by the original definition of $\Phi$.

### 2.2 Lemma $\quad \Phi$ preserves conjunction (and hence $\Phi$ is orderpreserving).

By " $\Phi$ preserves conjunction" we mean that if $f, g: A \rightarrow \Omega$ in $\varepsilon$, then $\Phi\left(\wedge_{\varepsilon}{ }^{\circ}(f, g)\right)=\wedge(\mathscr{\sigma} d){ }^{\circ}(\Phi(f), \Phi(g))$; similarly for the other cases to be considered below.

Proof: We have to show that

$$
G\left(\Omega^{A} \times \Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{G\left(\Lambda^{A}\right)} G\left(\Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{k} \Omega^{\bar{A}}=G\left(\Omega^{A} \times \Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{k \times k} \Omega^{\bar{A}} \times \Omega^{\bar{A}} \xrightarrow{\bar{A}} \Omega^{\bar{A}} .
$$

Passing to the transposed maps, the left-hand side becomes

$$
\begin{aligned}
\bar{A} & \times G\left(\Omega^{A} \times \Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{1 \times G\left(\Lambda^{A}\right)} \bar{A} \times G\left(\Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{e \times \times_{1}} G A \times G\left(\Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{G e v} G \Omega^{\rho} \Omega \\
= & \bar{A} \times G\left(\Omega^{A} \times \Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{(e, e) \times 1} G A \times G A \times G \Omega^{A} \\
& \times G \Omega^{A} \xrightarrow{\left(G e v \circ\left(\pi_{1}, \pi_{3}\right), G e v \circ\left(\pi_{2}, \pi_{4}\right)\right)} G \Omega \times G \Omega \xrightarrow{G \Lambda} G \Omega \xrightarrow{\rho} \Omega .
\end{aligned}
$$

Similarly, the right-hand side becomes

$$
\begin{aligned}
\bar{A} \times G\left(\Omega^{A} \times \Omega^{A}\right) & \xrightarrow{(e, e) \times 1} G A \times G A \times G \Omega^{A} \times G \Omega^{A} \xrightarrow{G e v \times G e v} G \Omega \\
& \times G \Omega \xrightarrow{\rho \times \rho} \Omega \times \Omega \stackrel{ }{\longrightarrow} \Omega .
\end{aligned}
$$

Therefore, it suffices to show that

commutes. But this follows easily from the fact that $\rho$ classifies $G 1 \xrightarrow{\text { Gtrue }} G \Omega$.
Note that from the fact that $\Phi: \operatorname{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(A) \rightarrow \operatorname{Sub}_{\mathcal{F} \downarrow d}(\bar{A})$ is orderpreserving, it immediately follows that for $U$ and $V \in S u b_{\mathcal{E}}(A)$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \Phi(U) \vee \Phi(V) \leqslant \Phi(U \vee V) \\
& \Phi(U \Rightarrow V) \quad \leqslant \Phi(U) \Rightarrow \Phi(V)
\end{aligned}
$$

### 2.3 Lemma $\Phi$ preserves $\top_{A}$, the largest subobject of $A$. Also, $\Phi$ preserves

 $\perp_{A}$, the smallest subobject, provided d preserves the initial object 0 .Proof: Following the same method as in the proof of Lemma 2.2, we see that it suffices to show that $G 1 \xrightarrow{\text { Gtrue }} G \Omega \xrightarrow{\rho} \Omega=1 \xrightarrow{\text { true }} \Omega$ (which is clear from the definition of $\rho$ ) and that $G 1 \xrightarrow{\text { Gfalse }} G \Omega \xrightarrow{\rho} \Omega=1 \xrightarrow{\text { false }} \Omega$. This latter identity only holds if $G$ preserves the initial, or, equivalently, if $d$ does. For in that case $\rho^{\circ}$ Gfalse classifies the subobject $G 0 \cong 0>1 \cong G 1$, since both squares of the diagram below are pullback

2.4 Remark: The properties of $\Phi$ that have been stated above also follow easily from the following alternative description of $\Phi$ : If $U>A$ is a subobject of $A$, then $\Phi(U) \cong e^{-1}(G U)$; that is, the following diagram is pullback


### 2.5 Lemma $\quad \Phi$ preserves negation (provided $d$ preserves 0 ).

Proof: From the fact that $\Phi(U \Rightarrow V) \leqslant \Phi(U) \Rightarrow \Phi(V)$, and $\Phi\left(\perp_{A}\right)=\perp_{\bar{A}}$, it follows that $\Phi(\neg U) \leqslant \neg \Phi(U)$.

As for the converse, it again suffices (as in the proof of Lemma 2.2) to show that the subobject classified by $G \Omega \stackrel{\rho}{\rightarrow} \Omega \xrightarrow{\urcorner} \Omega$ is contained in the subobject classified by $G \Omega \xrightarrow{G\urcorner} G \Omega \stackrel{\rho}{\longrightarrow} \Omega$. So make two pullbacks:


Now $P \leqslant G 1$ in $\operatorname{Sub}(G \Omega)$, for $\rho^{\circ} G$ false $\circ!=$ false $\circ!=\rho^{\circ} g$, so $G \perp \circ!=g$, since $\rho$ is mono.

We now turn to the quantificational structure. Let's first consider universal quantification. Recall that $\Omega^{B} \xrightarrow{\forall B} \Omega$ is the classifier of the exponentially transposed of $B \rightarrow 1 \xrightarrow{\text { true }} \Omega$. Universal quantification $\operatorname{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(A \times B) \rightarrow \operatorname{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(A)$
is then defined by composing an arrow $1 \rightarrow \Omega^{A \times B}$ with $\left(\forall_{B}\right)^{A}: \Omega^{A \times B} \cong$ $\left(\Omega^{B}\right)^{A} \rightarrow \Omega^{A}$.
2.6 Lemma $\Phi$ preserves universal quantification; that is, for a subobject $U>A \times B$ in $E, \Phi\left(\forall_{B}(U)\right) \cong \forall_{\bar{B}}(\Phi(U))$.
Proof: It again suffices to show that
(i) $G\left(\Omega^{A \times B}\right) \xrightarrow{G\left(\left(\forall_{B}\right)^{A}\right)} G\left(\Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{k} \Omega^{\bar{A}}=G\left(\Omega^{A \times B}\right) \xrightarrow{k} \Omega^{\bar{A} \times \bar{B}} \xrightarrow{(\forall \bar{B})^{\bar{A}}} \Omega^{\bar{A}}$.

It is easy to see that this would follow from
(ii) $G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{G\left(\forall_{B}\right)} G \Omega^{\rho} \Omega=G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{\frac{k}{\rightarrow}} \Omega^{\bar{B}} \xrightarrow{\forall \bar{B}} \Omega$.

Since the left-hand side in (ii) classifies $G\left(\left\ulcorner\operatorname{true}{ }_{B}\right\urcorner\right)$,

it suffices to show that the left-hand square of the diagram below is pullback


But since $k$ is mono, we only have to show that it commutes which is easy.
As for the existential quantifier, recall that $\Omega^{B} \xrightarrow{\exists_{B}} \Omega$ is the classifier of the image of $\epsilon_{B} \xrightarrow{e_{B}} \Omega^{B} \times B \xrightarrow{\pi_{1}} \Omega^{B}$. (We will write $\exists_{B}$ for this image.)

### 2.7 Lemma For a subobject $U \in \operatorname{Sub}_{\mathcal{E}}(A \times B), \exists_{\bar{B}} \Phi(U) \leqslant \Phi\left(\exists_{B}(U)\right)$.

Proof: As before, we have to show that the subobject of $G\left(\Omega^{B}\right)$ classified by $G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{k} \Omega^{\bar{B}} \xrightarrow{\exists \bar{B}} \Omega$ is contained in that classified by $G\left(\Omega^{B}\right) \xrightarrow{G\left({ }_{B} B\right)} G \Omega^{\rho} \Omega$.

Now $\rho^{\circ} G \exists_{B}$ classifies the image of $G \in_{B} \rightarrow G B \times G \Omega^{B} \xrightarrow{\pi} G \Omega^{B}$. Let $P$ be the subobject of $G\left(\Omega^{B}\right)$ classified by $\exists_{\bar{B}}$. Pullbacks preserve epi-mono-factorizations, so $P$ is the image of the pullback of $\epsilon_{\bar{B}} \rightarrow \Omega^{\bar{B}} \times \bar{B} \xrightarrow{\pi} \Omega^{\bar{B}}$ along $k$, or, the image of $\pi{ }^{\circ} q$ in the diagram below

$q$ is the pullback of $1 \xrightarrow{\text { true }} \Omega$ along $e v^{\circ}(1 \times k)=\rho^{\circ} G e v \circ(e \times 1)$


We have to show that $P \leqslant G \exists_{B}$, or, that $\pi{ }^{\circ} q$ factors through $G \exists_{B}$, or, that $G \exists{ }_{B} \circ \pi \circ q=G$ true. But $\pi \circ q=\pi \circ(e \times 1) \circ q=G \pi \circ G e_{B} \circ s$, and, by definition, $\exists_{B}{ }^{\circ} \pi{ }^{\circ} e_{B}=$ true, so $G \exists{ }_{B}{ }^{\circ} G \pi{ }^{\circ} G e_{B}{ }^{\circ} s=G$ true.
2.8 Lemma Let $\Delta_{A}>A \times A$ be the diagonal. Then
(i) $\Phi\left(\Delta_{A}\right) \geqslant \Delta_{\bar{A}}$
(ii) if $e_{A}$ is iso, $\Phi\left(\Delta_{A}\right)=\Delta_{\bar{A}}$.

Proof: Immediate from Remark 2.4.
We now return to question (2) of Section 1. Let us call an atomic formula simple if it is $T$ or $\perp$, or it is either of the form $\sigma_{1}=\sigma_{2}$, where $\sigma_{1}$ and $\sigma_{2}$ are terms (in the sense explained at the end of Section 1 !), or of the form $R\left(\sigma_{1}, \ldots, \sigma_{n}\right)$, where $\sigma_{1}, \ldots, \sigma_{n}$ are terms, and $R$ is a relational term without (free) variables occurring in it. Furthermore, we call an occurrence of $=$ in a formula basic if it occurs in a subformula $\sigma_{1}=\sigma_{2}$, where $\sigma_{1}$ and $\sigma_{2}$ are terms whose sorts are nonrelational, that is, have been built up from groundsorts without using the rule to make $\left[s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}\right]$ from $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}$.
2.9 Theorem Let $T$ be a theory which has a set of axioms of the form $\forall \bar{x}(\phi(\bar{x}) \rightarrow \psi(\bar{x}))$, where the atomic parts of $\phi$ and $\psi$ are simple, and

- $\exists, \forall$, and nonbasic $=$ occur only positively in $\phi$, and only negatively in $\psi$
- occurs only negatively in $\phi$, and only positively in $\psi$.

Then
(i) if $(\mathcal{\varepsilon}, \ell)$ is a model of $T$ and $\varepsilon \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{F}$ is a left-exact functor which preserves the initial object, then $\left(\left(\sigma^{\sigma} \downarrow d\right), \bar{\ell}\right)$ is a model of $T$,
(ii) $T$ has the disjunction-property.

Proof: (ii) follows from (i), and (i) follows easily from the properties of $\Phi$ that have been collected in the preceding lemmas.

We conclude with some remarks. First of all, it should be pointed out that the same techniques can be used to prove a result similar to Theorem 2.9 for theories having the existence property. Secondly, observe that the axioms of Higher-order Heyting's Arithmetic ( $H H A$ ) are not preserved. In other words, if the language has a basic sort $N$ for the natural numbers, and the theory $T$ includes $H H A \&(N)$ must be the natural number object of $\varepsilon$ for $(\varepsilon, \ell)$ to be a model of $T$, but $\bar{\ell}(N)=G \ell(N)$ is, in general, not the natural number object of
( $\mathscr{F} \downarrow d$ ). There are several ways to improve on this, one of them being contained in [6], so we will not go into this here.

Finally, a word about occurrences of the identity, which also illustrates the conditions on atomic formulas. Suppose, for example, that we have a constant $f$ of a functional sort $[[s] \rightarrow[s]]$ that is interpreted in $(\mathcal{E}, d)$ by $\ell(f): \Omega^{A} \rightarrow \Omega^{A}$, and that $\ell(f)$ equals the identity. Then $\varepsilon \xi_{l} \forall U: \Omega^{A} \cdot f(U)=U$, and the identity-symbol occurring in $\forall U: \Omega^{A} \cdot f(U)=U$ is nonbasic, so its preservation is not covered by the theorem. This is how it should be, since $\bar{\ell}(f)$ is $\Omega^{\bar{A}} \xrightarrow{e} G\left(\Omega^{A}\right) \xrightarrow{k} \Omega^{\bar{A}}$ in this case, which is not the identity-arrow. Rewriting $\forall U: \Omega^{A} \cdot f(U)=U$ as $\forall U: \Omega^{A} \forall x: A(f(U)(x) \longleftrightarrow U(x))$ does not help, since now the atomic part $f(U)(x)$ is not simple.

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