

JC Beall and Greg Restall

Logical Pluralism

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REVIEW

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The 20th century saw the rapid development of logic. At the same time, we saw the blossoming of (systems of) logics. Not only classical logic but also non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic logic and relevant logics (to name just a few), were all developed in that period. JC Beall and Greg Restall, in their *Logical Pluralism*, attempt to make sense of the plurality of logics. In presenting their logical pluralism, they argue that the logics mentioned above all equally deserve the title ‘logic’. Beall and Restall not only argue for logical pluralism but also provide many important insights on fundamental issues in logic.

Beall and Restall (B&R) take *logical consequence* to be the chief subject matter of logic. Logical consequence is a relation among claims expressed in a language: what claims follow from what claims. B&R analyse it in terms of the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT):

An argument is valid_{*x*} if and only if, in every case_{*x*} in which the premises are true, so is the conclusion. (p. 29)

GTT is a generalisation of Tarski’s notion of logical consequence: ‘The sentence *X* follows logically from the sentences of the class *K* if and only if every model of the class *K* is also a model of the sentence *X*’ (quoted in p. 29).

B&R’s logical pluralism can now be captured by the following conditions:

- (1) The settled core of *consequence* is given in GTT.
- (2) An instance of GTT is obtained by a *specification of the cases_x* in GTT, and a specification of the relation *is true in a case*. Such a specification can be seen as a way of spelling out *truth conditions*.