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Reviewed by

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There are several epistemological problems which have united the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of mind. One of them has been the question of the nature of mathematical truths. Kant thought that all mathematical truths were synthetic *a priori*; for Kant, that amounted to the thesis that mathematics depended on the forms of intuition, that is, on space and time. In his logicist program, Gottlob Frege tried to change the place of arithmetic in the division of sciences presented by Kant. In contribution to *Mathematics and Mind*, entitled "The Advantages of Honest Toil over Theft", on page 40, George Boolos mentions that, following Carnap, we may distinguish between two theses of logicism; the first states that the concepts of mathematics can be explicitly defined by means of logical concepts, while the second is the claim that the theorems of mathematics can be deduced from logical axioms by logical means alone. Boolos calls the first thesis the definability thesis and the second thesis the provability thesis of logicism. Frege was committed to both of those theses in his studies in the foundations of arithmetic. It may be worth noting that there was one more reading of the term 'logicism'; Theodor Ziehen remarks in his old textbook (1920) that at the turn of the century logicism meant the acknowledgement of an objective realm of ideal entities which were studied by logic and mathematics [1920, 173]. In Ziehen's list of names, representatives of that doctrine were Lotze, Windelband, Husserl, and Rickert, among others. Frege also defended some version of that kind of logicism.

In Frege's thought, intuition seemed to have lost its central role, as Frege placed the arithmetical truths into the group of analytic truths *a priori*. It is too much to argue that Frege relied on the same concepts of syntheticity and analyticity, or even on the same concepts of *a priori* and *a posteriori*, as Kant. However, we may say that his move did not mean a break between mathematics and mind; geometry was still regarded by Frege as synthetic *a priori*, and by trying to reduce arithmetic to logic Frege in