

PEIRCE RUSTLED, RUSSELL PIERCED:
HOW CHARLES PEIRCE AND BERTRAND RUSSELL VIEWED EACH OTHER'S
WORK IN LOGIC, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF RUSSELL'S ACCURACY AND
RÔLE IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF LOGIC*

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Abstract. Russell gave scant attention and assigned little importance to the work of Peirce and Schröder in particular and to the so-called "algebraic" tradition in logic in general, compared with the generous notice and attention he apportioned to the work of Frege and Peano. Yet at the turn of the century the work of logicians in the Boole-Peirce-Schröder tradition was adjudged by most

* Work on this paper was begun around 1986, about ten years after Benjamin S. Hawkins, Jr. began his [1992] paper comparing Peirce and Russell's work on logic and examining their attitude toward each other's work. The approaches of my paper and Hawkins's differ, since mine is written from the historiographic viewpoint and is concerned primarily with attitudes and with the historic impact which these views had on subsequent developments in logic, whereas Hawkins deals primarily with specific points of difference on logical matters from the technical viewpoint. Nevertheless, both papers utilize many of the same sources and come to much the same conclusion regarding the relative significance and logical correctness of the work of Peirce and Russell. Because I had greater and more frequent access to some of the archival materials than did Hawkins, I concluded my study only a few months after he completed his. I first learned of his research project in September 1989 (through an abstract he prepared for the logic sessions of the Peirce Sesquicentennial Conference), and I am grateful to him for sharing his work and views with me. As a matter of priority, however, Hawkins's work must take precedence.