zation of truth-predicates to languages represents well Simmons' basic contention that truth-predicates are context-sensitive.

This book attests to a growing interests in the Liar paradox. It is interesting to note that recently there have appeared two other very interesting books related to the Liar: A. Gupta and N. Belnap, *The Revision Theory of Truth* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1993, and E. Brendel, *Wahrheit über der Lügner* (Berlin, Gruyter, 1992).

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C. J. F. Williams, *Being, Identity, and Truth.* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992. xi + 213 pp.

Reviewed by

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Are we to believe that broad philosophical questions such as 'What is being?' or 'What is identity?' or 'What is truth?' have no answers outside of considerations of how logic works in language? This seems to be what C. J. F. Williams argues in his book *Being, Identity, and Truth.* We are to think of 'being'as no more than a name for the job done by the existential quantifier and the words which act as its proxies in English. 'Identity' is only a name for what happens when the variable bound by such a quantifier is repeated, and 'truth' is merely a name for what happens in certain contexts when this variable stands for a proposition. The reader of Williams' book will find not bold and profound answers to big questions, but big questions reinterpreted and answered as less ambitious ones about logic and language.

Being, Identity, and Truth is a summary of the arguments for the main results in Williams' trilogy *What Is Truth?* (Wil76), *What Is Existence?* (Wil81), and *What Is Identity?* (Wil89). In his preface, Williams explains that he wrote the book in response to critics of his earlier works who felt that he demanded of his readers too great a facility with the technical notions and notation of modern logic. The book under review not only avoids logical symbolism altogether, but also