

rious work, of course, the reader must often complete steps in logical arguments for him/herself.

In short, I find *Bayes or Bust* to be a witty and very readable treatment of the important topic of Bayesian confirmation theory. As a novice in this field, I have learned a great deal from the book, but I imagine that the expert would find it just as engaging. Earman's intention is to provoke as well as to inform through this work, and I judge his efforts to have been successful on both counts.

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*Reflexivity A Source-Book in Self-Reference*, edited by Steven J. Bartlett, Amsterdam, North-Holland 1992, XI + 509 pp.

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This book collects together several papers on a phenomenon of reflexivity. The anthology has an introduction by Bartlett and five parts: I. Semantical self-reference (W. V. Quine, 'Paradox'; P. Weiss, 'The Theory of Types'; J. Myhill, 'A system which can define its own truth'; G. Ryle, 'Heterogicality'; J. Jørgensen, 'Some reflections of reflexivity'; R. M. Martin, 'On non-translational semantics'; R. M. Smullyan, 'Languages in which self-reference is possible'; A. N. Prior, 'On a family of paradoxes'; N. Rescher, 'A note on self-referential statements'; R.L. Martin, 'Toward a solution to the Liar Paradox'; B.C. van Fraassen, 'Presupposition, implication, and self-reference'), II. Pragmatical self-reference (D.L. O'Connor, 'Pragmatic Paradoxes'; L.J. Cohen, 'Mr. O'Connor's "Pragmatic paradoxes"'); P. Alexander, 'Pragmatic paradoxes'; A. Duncan-Jones, 'Fugitive propositions'; D. J. O'Connor, 'Pragmatic paradoxes and fugitive propositions'; C. K. Grant, 'Pragmatic implication'; W. D. Hart, 'On self-reference'), III. Metalogical self-reference, F. B. Fitch, 'Self-reference in philosophy'; F. B. Fitch, 'Universal metalanguages for philosophy'; S. J. Bartlett, 'The idea of a