

cousin is rather a highly debatable philosophical project. Unfortunately, Glymour who regards both kinds of logic as equally justified and even usable, simply blurs the situation. A similar remark concerns the computational approach to mind which appears in Glymour's book as something obvious. However, Bayesianism in inductive logic as well as the computational model of mind do not exhaust varieties of approaches in related fields. This should be very clearly stated in any introductory textbook.

I have evaluated Glymour's book as a textbook of logic for beginners. My evaluation is rather critical: the book is simply misdirected. On the other hand, *Thinking Things Through* looks very impressive as a philosophical monograph on logic and its uses in philosophical analysis. Philosophers who have lost their contact with modern logic can refresh their knowledge of logical matters. Philosophers who have not forgotten logic can skip chapters on logic and concentrate on more philosophical topics of which the Bayesian-oriented logic of induction and the computational model of mind are particularly valuable. Since most graduate philosophers are probably aware that both approaches do not exhaust related fields, the warning that Glymour blurs the contemporary situation in inductive logic and philosophy of mind are not as important.

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Bertrand Russell, *Logical and philosophical papers, 1909-13*, edited by John G. Slater with the assistance of Bernd Frohmann, vol. 6 of *The collected papers of Bertrand Russell*, London and New York, Routledge, 1992.

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