

2002–2003 WINTER MEETING OF THE
ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC

Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
December 27–30, 2002

A Winter Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic was held December 27–30, 2002, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, at the Philadelphia Marriott, in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. The Program Committee consisted of John Burgess, William Ewald, and Scott Weinstein (Chair). The program included a Symposium on Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics chaired by John Burgess, and a Symposium devoted to Perspectives on Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics chaired by William Ewald. Each of the Symposia consisted of three hour-long talks as follows.

Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics.

Michael Friedman (Stanford University), *Kant's philosophy of mathematics in perspective.*

Anja Jauernig (University of Notre Dame), *The many functions of intuition in Kant and what to do with them.*

Lisa Shabel (Ohio State University), *Ostensive construction and diagrammatic reasoning in Kant's theory of geometry.*

Perspectives on Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics.

Donald A. Martin (UCLA), *A Suggestion about the logic of vagueness.*

Yiannis Moschovakis (UCLA), *Intensionality.*

Dana Scott (Carnegie Mellon University), *Social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics?*

Max Kanovich and Steven Lindell chaired the two sessions of contributed papers.

Abstracts of the invited talks and contributed talks given (in person or by title) by members of the Association for Symbolic Logic follow.

For the Program Committee
SCOTT WEINSTEIN

Abstracts of invited talks in the Symposium on Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics

- MICHAEL FRIEDMAN, *Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics in Perspective.*
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Kant's approach to the philosophy of mathematics is virtually unique in the history of philosophy in that he assigns the capacity for a priori knowledge in this science to the faculty of sensibility rather than the intellect. In this way he arrives at the quite unusual idea of a pure or a priori faculty of sensibility, whose structure is given by the "pure intuitions" of space and time. I explore the variety of factors motivating and sustaining Kant's unique