

Reduction of logics to the primitive logic

By Katuzi ONO

(Received April 1, 1967)

Introduction

Main conclusion of my work [2] has been the following: *Any logic belonging to J-series (the intuitionistic logic LJ, the minimal logic LM, and the positive logic LP, each without assuming Peirce's rule) or to K-series (the classical logic LK, the minimal logic LN, and the positive logic LQ which are stronger than LJ, LM and LP by Peirce's rule, respectively) can be faithfully interpreted in the primitive logic LO (the sub-logic of the intuitionistic logic LJ having the logical constants, implication and universal quantification, only). I call here any logic L a sub-logic of another logic L* if and only if every logical constant of L is a logical constant of L* and every proposition expressible in terms of the logical constant of L is provable in L if and only if it is provable in L*.*

Faithful interpretation of the intuitionistic logic LJ and the classical logic LK in the primitive logic LO can be realized by \mathfrak{R} -transform $\mathfrak{A}^{[\mathfrak{R}]}$ of any proposition \mathfrak{A} with respect to an n -ary relation \mathfrak{R} . $\mathfrak{A}^{[\mathfrak{R}]}$ can be defined recursively as follows (ξ stands for a sequence of n distinct variables, none of them is assumed to occur free in \mathfrak{F} and \mathfrak{G}):

$\mathfrak{F}^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \equiv (\xi)((\mathfrak{F} \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}(\xi)) \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}(\xi))$ for any elementary formula \mathfrak{F} ,

$$(\mathfrak{F} \rightarrow \mathfrak{G})^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \equiv (\mathfrak{F}^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \rightarrow \mathfrak{G}^{[\mathfrak{R}]}),$$

$$((t)\mathfrak{F})^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \equiv (t)\mathfrak{F}^{[\mathfrak{R}]},$$

$$(\mathfrak{F} \wedge \mathfrak{G})^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \equiv (\xi)((\mathfrak{F}^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \rightarrow (\mathfrak{G}^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}(\xi))) \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}(\xi)),$$

$$(\mathfrak{F} \vee \mathfrak{G})^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \equiv (\xi)((\mathfrak{F}^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}(\xi)) \rightarrow ((\mathfrak{G}^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}(\xi)) \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}(\xi))),$$

$$((\exists t)\mathfrak{F})^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \equiv (\xi)((t)(\mathfrak{F}^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}(\xi)) \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}(\xi)),$$

$$(\neg \mathfrak{F})^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \equiv \mathfrak{F}^{[\mathfrak{R}]} \rightarrow (\xi)\mathfrak{R}(\xi).$$

Now, we can prove the following theorem: \mathfrak{A} is provable in LJ if and only if $\mathfrak{A}^{[R]}$ is provable in LO, assuming that R is an n -ary relation symbol having no occurrence in \mathfrak{A} for some n ($n \geq 1$). \mathfrak{A} is provable in LK if and only if $\mathfrak{A}^{[R]}$ is provable in LO, assuming that R is a 0-ary relation symbol i. e. proposition symbol having no occurrence in \mathfrak{A} .