

REVIEWS

The Association for Symbolic Logic publishes analytical reviews of selected books and articles in the field of symbolic logic. The reviews were published in *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* from the founding of the JOURNAL in 1936 until the end of 1999. The Association moved the reviews to this BULLETIN, beginning in 2000.

The Reviews Section is edited by Steve Awodey (Managing Editor), John Baldwin, John Burgess, Mark Colyvan, Anuj Dawar, Marcelo Fiore, Noam Greenberg, Hannes Leitgeb, Ernest Schimmerling, Carsten Schürmann, Kai Wehmeier, and Matthias Wille. Authors and publishers are requested to send, for review, copies of books to *ASL, Box 742, Vassar College, 124 Raymond Avenue, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604, USA*.

In a review, a reference “JSL XLIII 148,” for example, refers either to the publication reviewed on page 148 of volume 43 of the JOURNAL, or to the review itself (which contains full bibliographical information for the reviewed publication). Analogously, a reference “BSL VII 376” refers to the review beginning on page 376 in volume 7 of this BULLETIN, or to the publication there reviewed. “JSL LV 347” refers to one of the reviews or one of the publications reviewed or listed on page 347 of volume 55 of the JOURNAL, with reliance on the context to show which one is meant. The reference “JSL LIII 318(3)” is to the third item on page 318 of volume 53 of the JOURNAL, that is, to van Heijenoort’s *Frege and vagueness*, and “JSL LX 684(8)” refers to the eighth item on page 684 of volume 60 of the JOURNAL, that is, to Tarski’s *Truth and proof*.

References such as 495 or 280I are to entries so numbered in *A bibliography of symbolic logic* (the JOURNAL, vol. 1, pp. 121–218).

DOMINIC HYDE. *Vagueness, logic and ontology*. Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008, xii + 226 pp.

Vagueness, logic and ontology is an important addition to the vagueness literature. Anyone working in the area needs to read it and will learn much from doing so. One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the way it combines discussions of two topics that have generally been treated more or less separately in the literature—vagueness (comprising issues to do with the proper treatment of vague language and the resolution of the sorites paradox) and ontological vagueness (comprising issues to do with vague objects: vagueness of composition, existence, identity and so on)—into a unified argument.

Chapter 1 introduces the notion of vagueness. Chapter 2 discusses Russell’s theory, on which vagueness is a purely representational phenomenon, not associated with any underlying ontological indeterminacy. Furthermore, vagueness is seen as a feature of natural language, not of ‘Ideal Language’ (p. 35), which—like the world—is precise. Hence classical logic can be retained, provided we restrict logic to ideal language.

Subsequent chapters seek a view which allows logic to be applied to natural language. Chapter 13 discusses approaches according to which classical logic may be retained by regimenting natural language into a precise language, without (serious) loss of expressive power. Hyde rejects three strategies for reaching such a language, concluding that we have no good reason to think that the world can be completely described in language free of vagueness.