

REVIEWS

This issue of the BULLETIN is the last one for which Herbert Enderton is the Coordinating Editor of the reviews. Beginning with the 2003 volume, Alasdair Urquhart will be the Managing Editor of the reviews. The other reviews editors are Geoffrey Hellman, Thomas Jech, Wolfram Pohlers, and Philip Scowcroft.

Authors and publishers are requested to send, for review, copies of books to the *Association for Symbolic Logic*, Box 742, Vassar College, 124 Raymond Avenue, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604, USA.

The Association for Symbolic Logic publishes analytical reviews of selected books and articles in the field of symbolic logic. The reviews were published in *The journal of symbolic logic* from the founding of the JOURNAL in 1936 until the end of 1999. The Association moved the reviews to this BULLETIN, beginning in 2000.

In a review, a reference “JSL XLIII 148,” for example, refers either to the publication reviewed on page 148 of volume 43 of the JOURNAL, or to the review itself (which contains full bibliographical information for the reviewed publication). Analogously, a reference “BSL VII 376” refers to the review beginning on page 376 in volume 7 of this BULLETIN, or to the publication there reviewed. “JSL LV 347” refers to one of the reviews or one of the publications reviewed or listed on page 347 of volume 55 of the JOURNAL, with reliance on the context to show which one is meant. The reference “JSL LIII 318(3)” is to the third item on page 318 of volume 53 of the JOURNAL, that is, to van Heijenoort’s *Frege and vagueness*, and “JSL LX 684(8)” refers to the eighth item on page 684 of volume 60 of the JOURNAL, that is, to Tarski’s *Truth and proof*.

References such as 495 or 280I are to entries so numbered in *A bibliography of symbolic logic* (the JOURNAL, vol. 1, pp. 121–218).

MARK BALAGUER. *Platonism and anti-platonism in mathematics*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1998, x + 217 pp.

There are two major challenges for the philosophy of mathematics that present severe difficulties for any attempt to defend Platonism or anti-Platonism regarding mathematical objects. Defenders of Platonism are faced with Benacerraf’s challenge, to explain how we can have knowledge of abstract mathematical objects in the absence of any causal link between the mathematical realm and the physical realm. In contrast, defenders of anti-Platonism, given that they cannot take mathematical statements *read at face value* to be true, must tackle the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, which holds that the indispensability of mathematics to natural science implies that we are committed to the truth of mathematical claims.

What is remarkable about Mark Balaguer’s *Platonism and anti-platonism in mathematics* is that he attempts to solve both of these problems, providing a version of Platonism (namely full-blooded Platonism, or FBP) that he claims to be immune to the Benacerraf challenge, as well as a version of anti-Platonism (namely fictionalism) that he defends against the Quine–Putnam argument. Furthermore, Balaguer argues, FBP (which holds that all logically possible mathematical objects exist) is the only defensible version of Platonism, and fictionalism is the only defensible version of anti-Platonism (since “realist” anti-Platonist