

REVIEWS

The Association for Symbolic Logic publishes analytical reviews of selected books and articles in the field of symbolic logic. The reviews were published in *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* from the founding of the JOURNAL in 1936 until the end of 1999. The Association moved the reviews to this BULLETIN, beginning in 2000.

The Reviews Section is edited by Steve Awodey (Managing Editor), John Burgess, Mark Colyvan, Anuj Dawar, Noam Greenberg, Rahim Moosa, Ernest Schimmerling, Alex Simpson, Kai Wehmeier, and Matthias Wille. Authors and publishers are requested to send, for review, copies of books to *ASL, Box 742, Vassar College, 124 Raymond Avenue, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604, USA*.

In a review, a reference “JSL XLIII 148,” for example, refers either to the publication reviewed on page 148 of volume 43 of the JOURNAL, or to the review itself (which contains full bibliographical information for the reviewed publication). Analogously, a reference “BSL VII 376” refers to the review beginning on page 376 in volume 7 of this BULLETIN, or to the publication there reviewed. “JSL LV 347” refers to one of the reviews or one of the publications reviewed or listed on page 347 of volume 55 of the JOURNAL, with reliance on the context to show which one is meant. The reference “JSL LIII 318(3)” is to the third item on page 318 of volume 53 of the JOURNAL, that is, to van Heijenoort’s *Frege and vagueness*, and “JSL LX 684(8)” refers to the eighth item on page 684 of volume 60 of the JOURNAL, that is, to Tarski’s *Truth and proof*.

References such as 495 or 280I are to entries so numbered in *A bibliography of symbolic logic* (the JOURNAL, vol. 1, pp. 121–218).

LEON HORSTEN. *The Tarskian Turn: deflationism and axiomatic truth*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2011, xii + 157 pp.

Without exaggerating, deflationism is the most popular philosophical conception of truth at the moment. The philosophical literature on the topic is full of variations and inhomogeneous. And, despite its popularity, deflationism has some drawbacks. One of the main concerns, however is its lack of clarity and an adequate explication of the commitments of deflationary theories is desirable. Axiomatic theories of truth in contrast are as clear and explicit as one could hope for. Since Friedman and Sheard’s seminal paper *An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth* (1987) the investigation of axiomatic theories of truth has become a field of growing importance. Horsten’s book is state of the art in both areas—deflationism and axiomatic theories of truth—and attempts to fruitfully combine them.

In the first three chapters of his book Horsten prepares the ground for his investigation. The first chapter is introductory. The second chapter contains a motivation for investigating axiomatic theories of truth. Horsten sets his undertaking apart from more traditional and substantial conceptions such as correspondence as well as from semantic versions such as Kripke’s. There he also introduces the driving criteria for his choice of axiomatic theories: soundness and strength. The third chapter prepares the reader with background information about the syntactical base theory, Peano arithmetic.

The fourth chapter contains a discussion of the most obvious deflationist theory of truth: disquotational truth. Horsten clearly evaluates the disquotational account in different