

THE 2009 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
AUSTRALASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR LOGIC

SPONSORED BY THE ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC

University of Melbourne, Australia
July 11–12, 2009

The 2009 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for Logic took place at the University of Melbourne, Australia, on July, 11–12, 2009. The conference was organized by Ross Brady of La Trobe University, with the help of Graham Priest, Greg Restall, Conrad Asmus and Aaron Guthrie, of the University of Melbourne, and Su Rogerson of Monash University. The program consisted of contributed talks of 40 minutes and 60 minutes in length. Tributes were given to Professors Robert Meyer and Len Goddard, both recently deceased.

Abstracts of the invited and contributed talks that were presented at the conference follow.

For the Organizing Committee
ROSS BRADY

Abstracts of contributed talks

- ▶ CONRAD ASMUS, *Laws that lie: physics and logic*.
Philosophy, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia.
E-mail: casmus@unimelb.edu.au.

I argue that more attention should be paid to the similarities and connections between the philosophy of science and the philosophy of logic. I will demonstrate that there are important insights from the philosophy of science which logicians and philosophers of logic can utilise in their theorising. I will go on to demonstrate a particular example of this. In *How the laws of physics lie*, Cartwright argues that physical theories can either be explanatory or accurate but not both. I will demonstrate how a similar position can be developed in the philosophy of logic, giving rise to a novel argument for logical pluralism.

- ▶ J. C. BEALL, *Truth, necessity and abnormal worlds*.
Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, USA.
E-mail: jc.beall@uconn.edu.

A theory of truth answers both ‘nature’ and ‘logic’ questions. On the former front, questions concern the ‘nature’, if any, of truth. On the latter front, questions—with truth-theoretic paradoxes in the forefront—concern the logic of ‘true’. In *Spandrels of truth* (Oxford, 2009), I answer the former question along deflationary lines, and the latter question along ‘dialetheic’ lines. In short: ‘true’ is a see-through device introduced for expressive