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REVIEWS

The Association for Symbolic Logic publishes analytical reviews of selected books and articles in the field of symbolic logic. The reviews were published in ***The Journal of Symbolic Logic*** from the founding of the JOURNAL in 1936 until the end of 1999. The Association moved the reviews to this BULLETIN, beginning in 2000.

The Reviews Section is edited by Alasdair Urquhart (Managing Editor), Steve Awodey, John Baldwin, Lev Beklemishev, Mirna Džamonja, David Evans, Erich Grädel, Denis Hirschfeldt, Roger Maddux, Luke Ong, Volker Peckhaus, Wolfram Pohlers, and Sławomir Solecki. Authors and publishers are requested to send, for review, copies of books to *ASL, Box 742, Vassar College, 124 Raymond Avenue, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604, USA*.

In a review, a reference "JSL XLIII 148," for example, refers either to the publication reviewed on page 148 of volume 43 of the JOURNAL, or to the review itself (which contains full bibliographical information for the reviewed publication). Analogously, a reference "BSL VII 376" refers to the review beginning on page 376 in volume 7 of this BULLETIN, or to the publication there reviewed. "JSL LV 347" refers to one of the reviews or one of the publications reviewed or listed on page 347 of volume 55 of the JOURNAL, with reliance on the context to show which one is meant. The reference "JSL LIII 318(3)" is to the third item on page 318 of volume 53 of the JOURNAL, that is, to van Heijenoort's *Frege and vagueness*, and "JSL LX 684(8)" refers to the eighth item on page 684 of volume 60 of the JOURNAL, that is, to Tarski's *Truth and proof*.

References such as 49***5*** or 280***I*** are to entries so numbered in *A bibliography of symbolic logic* (the JOURNAL, vol. 1, pp. 121–218).

DAVID CHRISTENSEN. ***Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.*** Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004 xii + 187 pp.

As its subtitle indicates, this is a book on epistemology; as the title intimates, classical logic does not come off well. The author distinguishes two models of belief, a binary approach according to which an item is either believed or not believed, and a graded approach, in which each item of belief is allocated a certain degree. A binary approach to rational belief seems to call for the imposition of logical constraints: One's set of rational beliefs should be *consistent* and it should be *deductively closed*. Chapters One and Two set the stage for making a choice between the binary approach to rationality and the graded approach to rationality.

The two constraints on rational belief of consistency and deductive closure are lumped together as *deductive cogency*. The first serious section of the book (Chapters Three and Four) consists of an exposition and discussion of Makinson's paradox of the preface (***Analysis***, vol. 25 (1965), pp. 205–207), and of Kyburg's lottery paradox in ***Probability and the logic of rational belief***. The discussion takes place on the level of examples and intuitions ("pre-theoretic intuitions"). Although much of the relevant literature is cited, the author has nothing new to add: " ... it seems to me that if logic has a role to play in shaping epistemic rationality, it will not be the one of subjecting binary belief to deductive cogency" (p. 105). There is no discussion of what we might call the Fregean view in ***The foundations of arithmetic***, recently pushed by Gil Harman in his ***Change in view***, according to which logic is a theory of what follows from what, not a theory of constraints on what one should believe.

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