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WHAT IS A SCIENCE?

ROLF SCHOCK

One of the basic problems of the philosophy of science is (or at least should be) that of exactly determining what a science is. A brief solution to this problem is proposed here on the basis of certain concepts introduced by the author in 'Contributions to syntax, semantics, and the philosophy of science' (*Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, Vol. 5, 1964).

If we consider some of the sciences (for example, mathematics, physics, astronomy, geology, biology, and psychology), we find that each of them contains not just one theory, but finitely many; moreover, each of the contained theories is associated in the science with a system which determines to what extent that theory is adequate with respect to a set of objects that the science deals with. This state of affairs can be reconstructed as follows:

Definition 1. t is a theoretical system just in case s is an 8-term sequence such that

- (1) t(1) is a symbol sequence
- (2) t(2) is a theory in s

(3) t(3) is an interpreter with respect to s

(4) t(4) is a finite subset of U(t(3))

(5) t(5) is a finite or denumerably infinite sequence whose range is included in the set of all theorems of t(1) by t(2)

(6) t(6) is a finite or denumerably infinite sequence whose range is included in the set of all formulas of t(1)

(7) t(7) is included in the set of all formulas of t(1)

(8) t(8) is a finite or denumerably infinite sequence whose range is included in the set of all theorems of t(1) by t(2).

Definition 2. If t is a theoretical system, then

(1) the degree of confirmation of t = the degree of confirmation of t(2) with respect to t(3), t(4), t(5), and t(1)

(2) the explanatory power of t = the explanatory power of t(2) with respect to t(6) and t(1)

(3) the degree of deductive simplicity of t = the degree of deductive simplicity of t(2) with respect to t(7), t(8), and t(1)

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