

POSSIBILITY-ELIMINATION IN NATURAL DEDUCTION

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F. B. Fitch's extension of the subordinate-proof technique to modal logic¹ represents an interesting and valuable contribution to both study and exposition in the field. The modal introduction and elimination (intelim) rule-schemata he offers are these:

$\Box E$:	$\frac{\Box p}{p}$	$\Diamond I$:	$\frac{p}{\Diamond p}$
$\Box I$:	$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \Box \\ \vdots \\ p \\ \Box p \end{array}}{\Box p}$	$\Diamond E$:	$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \Diamond p \\ \Box p \\ \vdots \\ q \\ \Diamond q \end{array}}{\Diamond q}$
$\sim \Box E$:	$\frac{\Box \sim p}{\Diamond \sim p}$	$\sim \Diamond I$:	$\frac{\Box \sim p}{\sim \Diamond p}$
$\sim \Box I$:	$\frac{\Diamond \sim p}{\sim \Box p}$	$\sim \Diamond E$:	$\frac{\sim \Diamond p}{\Box \sim p}$

If the propositional base, to which it is understood that these rules are appended, is classical, then a system similar to Lewis' S4 is obtained by permitting only propositions of the form $\Box p$ (or $\sim \Diamond p$) to be reiterated into the strict subordinate proofs of $\Box I$ and $\Diamond E$. A weaker system similar to S2 is obtained by requiring such a reiterated proposition to drop its left-most modal operator.²

Two peculiarities, related in part to Fitch's restricted form of $\sim I$, emerge upon consideration of his modal rules. (1) Even on a classical base (which will be assumed throughout), the last four rules—those relating \Box and \Diamond —cannot be derived from the first four—the fundamental intelim rules for \Box and \Diamond ; and they are thus needed to complete the modal apparatus, (2) $\Box E$ and $\Diamond I$ can be derived from each other, and $\Diamond E$ from $\Box I$ (in the appropriate forms determined by the definition of $\Box p$ as $\sim \Diamond \sim p$ and $\Diamond p$ as $\sim \Box \sim p$). But $\Box I$ in the form