ON TWO IMMEDIATE INFERENCES BY LIMITATION

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In a situation where one is trying to determine the truth or falsity of a categorical proposition A in relation to a categorical proposition B which is given as true, it seems plausible to adjust A by means of conversion, obversion, and contraposition to some proposition C which has the same subject and predicate terms as B, and then to decide the truth or falsity of C by immediate inference according to the traditional square of opposition, and finally to decide A on the basis of the determination of C. Consider the following examples:

I. **A:** All S is P.   **B:** Some S is non-P.
    (1) All S is P.
    (2) No S is non-P. (obverse of (1))

(2) is false if **B** is true; hence, (1), i.e., **A**, is false if **B** is true.

II. **A:** All S is P.   **B:** Some S is non-P.
    (1) All S is P.
    (2) Some P is S. (converse (by limitation) of (1))
    (3) Some S is P. (converse of (2))
    (4) Some S is not non-P. (obverse of (3))

The truth-value of (4) is undetermined in relation to **B**, and it would seem that **A**'s truth-value is likewise undetermined.

III. **A:** No S is non-P.   **B:** Some S is not P.
    (1) No S is non-P.
    (2) All S is P. (obverse of (1))

Given that **B** is true, (2) is false and so is **A**.

IV. **A:** No S is non-P.   **B:** Some S is not P.
    (1) No S is non-P.
    (2) Some P is not non-S. (contrapositive (by limitation) of (1))
    (3) Some P is S. (obverse of (2))
    (4) Some S is P. (converse of (3))