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## ON A SYNTACTICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF LOGICAL EXPRESSIONS

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## In *The Logical Syntax of Language*, Rudolf Carnap proposed the following characterization of logical and descriptive expressions:

Let  $E_1$  be the product of all expressional classes  $E_i$  of [a language] S, which fulfil the following four conditions....1. If  $U_1$  [is an expression of any form which] belongs to  $E_i$ , then  $U_1$  is not empty and there exists a sentence which can be sub-divided into partial expressions in such a way that all belong to  $E_i$  and one of them is  $U_1$ . 2. Every sentence which can be thus sub-divided into expressions of  $E_i$  is determinate. 3. The expressions of  $E_i$  are as small as possible, that is to say, no expression belongs to  $E_i$  that can be sub-divided into several expressions of  $E_i$ . 4.  $E_i$  is as comprehensive as possible, that is to say, it is not a proper sub-class of a class which fulfils both (1) and (2). An *expression* is called logical  $(U_L)$  if it is capable of being sub-divided into expressions of  $E_1$ ; otherwise it is called descriptive  $(U_D)$ . A *language* is called *logical* if it contains only [logical symbols]  $a_L$ ; otherwise descriptive.<sup>1</sup>

Although this characterization has often been found unacceptable,<sup>2</sup> I do not believe that anyone has ever pointed out how badly and simply it fails. W. V. Quine had a "would-be" argument in "Carnap and Logical Truth"<sup>3</sup> which is along the lines that I have in mind. Quine considered adding the extra-logical general term "heavier than" to a language in which Carnap's dichotomy supposedly held. Quine then asked whether adding general rules

<sup>1.</sup> Rudolf Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London (1967), pp. 177-178. (I have made obvious inconsequential changes in notation to avoid Carnap's German symbolism.)

<sup>2.</sup> See, e.g., W. V. Quine, "Carnap and Logical Truth" in *The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays*, Random House, New York (1966), especially section 7.

<sup>3.</sup> Ibid., pp. 116-117.