

K1 AS A DAWSON MODELLING OF A. R. ANDERSON'S SENSE OF "OUGHT"

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Alan Ross Anderson once wrote "from a formal point of view we may regard deontic logic simply as a branch of alethic logic." This claim from p. 178 of [1], a reprinting of his "The Formal Analysis of Normative Systems," is not strictly correct.*

To use Anderson's sense of "ought" is to define the deontic formulae: $O(p)$ and $P(p)$, by one of the following patterns.

Pattern I: $O(p) =_{df} L(\sim p \supset S)$
 $P(p) =_{df} \sim O(\sim p)$

Pattern II: $P(p) =_{df} M(p, \sim S)$
 $O(p) =_{df} \sim P(\sim p)$

Of course, $O(p)$ symbolizes "It ought to be that p " while $P(p)$ symbolizes "It is permitted that p ." $L(p)$ symbolizes "It is necessary that p " and $M(p)$ symbolizes "It is possible that p ." In these patterns, S represents a contingent proposition saying that a sanction has been incurred. I say that Anderson's sense of "ought" is given by definition patterns rather than by definitions because they give only a recipe for defining "ought." We do not have a definition until we have a logic for $L()$ and $M()$ and specify exactly what S says. In this essay I shall not discuss the adequacy of using such a pattern for defining "ought."

Anderson uses the second pattern in [1] when he investigates ways of developing deontic logic within different systems of alethic logic. However, he uses the first pattern when he discusses and defends his patterns for defining "ought" and "permitted." Anderson discusses and defends these patterns on pages 170-171 and 200-205 of [1] as well as in [2] and [3]. In 1967 in [5], Anderson continued to defend the basic idea behind his pattern for defining "ought," viz. to say that you ought to do something is to say

*This work was supported in part by the Ohio State University Development Fund through its Faculty Summer Fellowship Program.