

THE ONTOLOGICAL THEOREM

CHARLES D. BROWN

Charles Hartshorne presented a proof of the Ontological Argument containing the postulate, $p \rightarrow \sim\Diamond\sim p$, which he calls "Anselm's Principle."¹ Few of us, however, would accept even the weaker expression, $p \supset \sim\Diamond\sim p$, as plausible, and most of us would reject it on intuitive grounds.² If we do deny it, then strange things happen in any standard modal system that is sufficiently complex (e.g., Feys' System T) to contain an equivalent of the rule:

(R) $\vdash \alpha \therefore \vdash \Diamond\beta \supset \Diamond(\alpha \cdot \beta)$.

For example:

\rightarrow (1)	$\sim(p \supset \sim\Diamond\sim p)$	
(2)	$\vdash p \cdot \Diamond\sim p$	1, PC
(3)	$\vdash p$	2, PC
(4)	$\vdash \Diamond \sim p \supset \Diamond(p \cdot \sim p)$	3, R
(5)	$\vdash \Diamond \sim p$	2, PC
(6)	$\vdash \Diamond(p \cdot \sim p)$	4,5, PC
(7)	$\vdash \sim(p \supset \sim\Diamond\sim p) \supset \Diamond(p \cdot \sim p)$	1-6, PC
(8)	$\vdash \sim\Diamond(p \cdot \sim p) \supset (p \supset \sim\Diamond\sim p)$	7, PC

Let us call (8) the Ontological Theorem. If we assume the law of Non-Contradiction then we are forced by the Ontological Theorem to accept

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1. Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection* (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 49ff, esp. p. 51.
 2. Nicholas Rescher, in "On the formalization of two modal theses," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, vol. II (1961), pp. 154-157, formulates "No 'mere fact' or 'merely contingent proposition' entails a necessary proposition" as a tautology by imbedding the consequent ($\sim\Box q$) as a conjunctive component ($\Diamond\sim q$) of the antecedent of the strict implication. His formulation does avoid the *consequentia mirabilis*, which was his purpose in having $\Diamond\sim q$ in the antecedent; but the Ontological Theorem in no way involves the *consequentia mirabilis*, either.

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