

## Anderson's Deontic Logic and Relevant Implication

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In [1], Anderson proposed that his well-known reduction schema for defining deontic operators within intensional logics should be formulated in the Anderson-Belnap logic  $R$  of relevant implication.\* My purpose in this paper is to examine this proposal.

For those unfamiliar with Anderson's work in deontic logic I will provide a brief summary before turning to the main task of the paper. From 1956 onward Anderson formulated and defended the view that the logic of norms, i.e., obligations, permissions, prohibitions, and the like, should be explored by treating normative statements as certain kinds of conditionals. Thus to say of a certain act, e.g., John's closing the door, that it is *obligatory* (to say that John *ought* to close the door), is to say that if the act is not performed (John doesn't close the door), then some undesirable state-of-affairs results. Put formally, Anderson's schema captures this understanding of obligation: let  $O$  be the sentence operator "It is obligatory that," let  $\Rightarrow$  be a conditional connective, and let  $V$  be a sentential constant which denotes the undesirable state-of-affairs. Then  $Op$ , when  $p$  is some sentence letter, is defined as follows:

$$Op =_{df} \sim p \Rightarrow V.$$

Many commentators on Anderson's early papers on this subject fastened upon the constant  $V$  and argued: (a) undesirable states-of-affairs do not always follow infractions, even where they are specified as in some statutes, and (b) the most general sorts of norms, in any case, cannot be understood as involving Andersonian conditionals. Too much, in my view, was made of the

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