

## GENERALISED LOGIC II

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**1** This paper is a continuation of [1] in which generalised sentential logic is fully developed in a sequence of axiom systems designated  $GL0$  to  $GL5$ . In Section 2 a minor adjustment is made to the system of [1] to form the system  $GL0$ , and  $GL1$  is then formed by adding an axiom implicit in the discussion in [1];  $G.L.0$  and  $G.L.1$  are further variants. The next two sections break new ground by adding axioms to greatly strengthen sentential generalised logic: the resulting systems are  $GL2$ ,  $G.L.2$ , and  $GL3$ ,  $G.L.3$ . In Section 5 it is shown that  $G.L.3$  captures a conventional five-valued logic,  $C.L.3$ , based on truth tables and that a further five-valued logic,  $C.L.5$ , is characteristic of an arbitrary extension of  $G.L.3$  designated  $G.L.5$ . This result is used to prove consistency and further metatheorems about the earlier systems. In Section 6 the five-valued analysis is used for further developments pointing beyond the scope of the paper.

Theorems of some system, say  $GLx$ , are designated "xT..." (thus the theorems of [1] become 0T...). The designation "xT..." implies that I do not believe xT... is a theorem of a weaker system of the paper than  $GLx$ , but not that I have proved this. Metatheorems are designated "MT...", Heyting's sentential logic "HL", Boolean sentential logic "BL", and generalised logic (any system) "GL". Expressions of the form " $x(. . y . .)$ " (e.g., " $N(. . ? . .)$ ", " $?(. . ? . .)$ ",) are used to designate kinds of formula within which there are occurrences of the monadic operator  $y$  dominated, in a subformula or the whole formula, by the monadic operator  $x$ .

**2** The systems discussed in this section are  $GL0$ ,  $GL1$ ,  $G.L.0$ , and  $G.L.1$ , and the axioms discussed are:

$ECfgEKfgf . . . . . A19.$

$ENfEfKsNs . . . . . A20.$

[1] includes the definition D1,  $Cfg = EKfgf$  and this blocks the full development of GL. The reason is that a definition sanctions interchangeability of the definiens and the definiendum in all contexts and so, for example, D1 gives  $E?Cpq?EKpqp$ , which by A22 and A24 (discussed in **3**) is not a thesis of GL. Arbitrary definitions are, of course, admissible, but D1 is not arbitrary because, for example,  $C$  is derivable from subordinate