

Book Review

C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens, eds., *Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language and Mind*. CSLI Lecture Notes no. 20, Stanford, 1990. 342 pages.

This volume contains twelve articles on propositional attitudes and the logic and semantics of their ascription. At one end of the spectrum are two papers examining the relationship between intentionality and consciousness, by John Searle and Keith Gunderson. At the other end are papers on modality and discourse representation theory by Kit Fine and Hans Kamp. Tyler Burge, Robert Stalnaker, Joseph Owens, and the team of John Wallace and H. E. Mason contribute papers focusing on the basis for and the upshot of non-individualistic views of mental content. Keith Donnellan, Nathan Salmon, Stephen Schiffer, and (jointly) Ernest Lepore and Barry Loewer write on puzzles about belief and the semantics of belief ascription. C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens organized the 1988 University of Minnesota conference where these papers were first presented. They provide a lucid introduction to the volume and a useful bibliography.

Of necessity, the path I take through the papers will be selective. I shall focus on a group of papers united by a concern with the representational intermediaries—concepts, senses, modes of presentation, meanings—which mediate cognition.

One of the most far-reaching and important papers in the volume is Stephen Schiffer's "The Mode-of-Presentation Problem." Schiffer contends that every theorist who sees belief as a relation to propositions needs to invoke modes of presentation and he challenges the propositionalist to say just what modes of presentation *are*. According to Schiffer, none of the familiar construals are acceptable, and so propositionalism is untenable.

All propositionalists need modes of presentation because of the inconsistency of some of our thoughts. Ralph feeds a dog at his door in the evening and names it "Fido." Unwittingly, he feeds the same dog in the morning and names it "Fifi." Ralph expresses a belief by saying "Fido is male" and another by saying "Fifi is not male." His beliefs have inconsistent truth conditions: for both beliefs to be true, one and the same thing would have to be both male and not male. In order to capture the fact that Ralph is not irrational, the propositionalist must say that (1) Ralph thinks of the two-named dog under two different modes of presentation, and (2) Ralph fails to recognize them as modes of presentation