

THE PRAGMATICS OF TRUTH FUNCTIONS

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A sentential calculus may be conceived as a pair $\langle \mathbf{S}, \mathbf{R} \rangle$, where \mathbf{S} is a set of sentences generated by the operations of infixing “.” and prefixing “ \sim ” from a given non-empty set of unanalyzed sentences, and \mathbf{R} is the smallest equivalence relation on \mathbf{S} which meets the following conditions:

1. $\mathbf{R}(s \cdot s', s' \cdot s)$,
2. $\mathbf{R}(s \cdot (s' \cdot s''), (s \cdot s') \cdot s'')$,
3. $\mathbf{R}(s \cdot \sim s', s'' \cdot \sim s'')$ if and only if $\mathbf{R}(s \cdot s', s)$,
4. if $\mathbf{R}(s, s')$, then $\mathbf{R}(s \cdot s'', s' \cdot s'')$,
5. if $\mathbf{R}(s, s')$, then $\mathbf{R}(\sim s \cdot \sim s')$,

for all s, s', s'' in \mathbf{S} . If an extra-logical axiom s_0 is adjoined to the sentential calculus, then \mathbf{R} is the smallest equivalence relation on \mathbf{S} which meets 1 - 5 and:

6. $\mathbf{R}(s_0, \sim(s \cdot \sim s))$,

for some $s \in \mathbf{S}$. If there exist at least two equivalence classes, then $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{S}/\mathbf{R}$, the set of equivalence classes of \mathbf{S} under \mathbf{R} , has the structure of a non-trivial Boolean algebra. If $p, q \in \mathbf{B}$ and $s \in p$, $s' \in q$, then $p \wedge \bar{q}$ and p may be defined respectively as the equivalence classes of $s \cdot s'$ and $\sim s$. The ordered triple $\langle \mathbf{B}, \wedge, - \rangle$ may be seen to be a Boolean algebra.

A Boolean logic, or logic of truth functions, may be conceived as a Boolean algebra $\langle \mathbf{B}, \wedge, - \rangle$ together with a sum ideal (or filter) \mathbf{I} of \mathbf{B} . For in the case that \mathbf{I} is a maximal proper sum ideal, the induced algebra on \mathbf{B}/\mathbf{I} is simple and may be considered as the Boolean algebra of truth values. Hence the homomorphism from $\langle \mathbf{B}, \wedge, - \rangle$ to the induced algebra on \mathbf{B}/\mathbf{I} may be considered as an interpretation of the elements of \mathbf{I} as true (in the present case, the proposition containing sentences equivalent to some tautology), and of the remaining elements of \mathbf{B} as false. Thus where \mathbf{I} is maximal and proper, we may say that $\langle \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{I}, \wedge, - \rangle$ is complete and consistent.

These considerations suggest that if a set \mathbf{S} of sentences, such as is described above, is given together with a set of performances of the users of \mathbf{S} , then one might find a characterization of subsets of performances which will induce on \mathbf{S} the structure appropriate for a truth-functional logic.