

A PARADOX IN ILLATIVE COMBINATORY LOGIC

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Curry, in [1] and [2], has shown the inconsistency of a system of illative combinatory logic containing the axiom:

$$\vdash H^k \mathfrak{X} \text{ for all obs } \mathfrak{X},$$

for $k = 2$ (and 1). (' $H\mathfrak{X}$ ' stands for ' \mathfrak{X} is a proposition'.) He also stated that the inconsistency held for $k > 2$, this more general result is proved below. Assume the following:

- A1 $H\mathfrak{X}, H\mathfrak{Y}, H\mathfrak{Z} \vdash \mathfrak{X} \supset \mathfrak{Y} \supset \mathfrak{Z} : \supset : \mathfrak{X} \supset \mathfrak{Y} . \supset . \mathfrak{X} \supset \mathfrak{Z} .$
 A2 $H\mathfrak{X}, H\mathfrak{Y} \vdash \mathfrak{X} \supset \mathfrak{Y} \supset \mathfrak{X} .$
 A3 $\mathfrak{X}, P\mathfrak{X}\mathfrak{Y} \vdash \mathfrak{Y} .$
 A4 $\mathfrak{X} \vdash H\mathfrak{X} .$
 A5 $\vdash H^{k+1} \mathfrak{X}$ for any \mathfrak{X} and $k \geq 0$.
 A6 $\vdash H\mathfrak{A} .$
 A7 If $\vdash H\mathfrak{X}$ and $\mathfrak{X} \vdash H\mathfrak{Y}$ then $\vdash H(P\mathfrak{X}\mathfrak{Y})$.

From A1, A2, A3 and A7 it follows (as is proved in [4]) that if $T(\mathfrak{X}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{X}_n)$ is any theorem of pure implicational intuitionistic propositional calculus for indeterminates $\mathfrak{X}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{X}_n$, then

$$H\mathfrak{X}_1, H\mathfrak{X}_2, \dots, H\mathfrak{X}_n \vdash T(\mathfrak{X}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{X}_n).$$

This fact is used in several places below.

Let $G_0 \equiv [x]. x \supset \mathfrak{A} ,$

and for $n \geq 0$ let

$$G_{n+1} \equiv [x]. H^{n+1}x \supset G_nx .$$

Now

$$H^{n+1}x \vdash H(G_nx) \tag{1}$$

is proved by induction, thus:

By A6 and A7

$$Hx \vdash H(G_0x).$$