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RECONSTRUCTING FORMAL LOGIC: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND CONSIDERATIONS

GEORGE GOE

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§1. *Introduction.** In [8][1] I argued for the desirability of founding deduction theory on a system of "pure" first order logic in which:

(a) all formulas that may appear as lines in derivations, *i.e.* all formulas that are construed as statements or as statement forms, when fully written out in primitive notation contain no individual variables free and do not contain singular terms that are not subject to quantification (proper nouns[2] or dummy symbols used in their place in statement forms);
(b) only formulas that are valid in every domain, (including the empty domain) are theorems.

Of a first order quantification system that satisfies condition (a) we say that it is *primitively general,*[3] and of one that satisfies condition (b) we say that it is *non-existential.*[4] 'Primitively general' is a syntactical predicate,

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