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## RUSSELL ON THE MEANING OF DESCRIPTIONS

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1 An important component of Russell's theory of descriptions is the thesis that no description has any meaning. He proposes an argument for this thesis in the following paragraph from *My Philosophical Development*.<sup>1</sup>

The central point of the theory of descriptions was that a phrase may contribute to the meaning of a sentence without having any meaning at all in isolation. Of this, in the case of descriptions, there is precise proof: If 'the author of Waverley' meant anything other than 'Scott', 'Scott is the author of Waverley' would be false, which it is not. If 'the author of Waverley' meant 'Scott', 'Scott is the author of Waverley' would be a tautology, which it is not. Therefore, 'the author of Waverley' means neither 'Scott' nor anything else—i.e. 'the author of Waverley, means nothing, Q.E.D.

In this paper\* I would like to discuss whether this argument succeeds in proving that the description 'the author of *Waverley*' does not have any meaning thereby proving that no description has any meaning. To facilitate my discussion, I will represent Russell's argument in the following form.

- (a) If 'the author of *Waverley*' means anything other than 'Scott', then 'Scott is the author of *Waverley*' is false.
- (b) 'Scott is the author of Waverley' is not false.
- (c) If 'the author of *Waverley*' means 'Scott', then 'Scott is the author of *Waverley*' is a tautology.
- (d) 'Scott is the author of Waverley' is not a tautology.
- (e) It is false that 'the author of *Waverley*' means anything other than 'Scott', and it is false that 'the author of *Waverley*' means 'Scott', i.e. 'the author of *Waverley*' means nothing.

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<sup>1.</sup> Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development, Simon and Schuster, New York (1965), p. 85.