

## DOES QUOTATION SOMETIMES PERMIT SUBSTITUTION?

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At the end of his discussion of the referential opacity of quotation, in §30 of *Word and Object* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1960), Quine remarks,

It would be wrong to suppose that an occurrence of a term within an opaque construction is barred from referential position in every broader context. Examples to the contrary are provided by the occurrences of the personal name in:

- (8) "Tully was a Roman" is true,  
 (9) "Tully" refers to a Roman.

Despite the opacity of quotation, these occurrences of the personal name are clearly subject to substitutivity of identity *salva veritate*, thanks to the peculiarities of the main verbs involved. (p. 146)

A similar passage appears in 'Reference and Modality' (*From a Logical Point of View*, Harper Torchbooks, 1963), following which Quine adds,

The examples . . . are exceptional in that the special predicates "is true" and ["refers"] have the effect of undoing the single quotes . . . (p. 141)

His point, I take it, is that (due to the referential transparency of the sentence contained by the quotes in (8)) the predicate of (8) (' . . . is true') continues in fact to be true of the subject (the sentence 'Tully was a Roman') under substitution of any other name of Tully for 'Tully'. And given the truth of (9), we know (trivially) that any term which corefers with 'Tully' will refer to a Roman; consequently the substitution of any such term for 'Tully' will in fact preserve the truth of (9).

So far, so good; but this point is at best misleading. Quine takes it to show that 'Tully' occurs *referentially* in (8) and in (9) (see the passages quoted above). But those occurrences of 'Tully' fail at least one crucial test for referentiality, suggested by Quine's own work—viz., the occurrences do not satisfy the inference-schema associated with Leibniz' Law:

$$\frac{\phi a \quad a = b}{\phi b}$$