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Nominalization and Scott's Domains II

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1 Introduction In Turner [17] we developed a semantics for nominalized predicates within the general framework of Montague Grammar. We offered an extension of Montague's *PTQ* which sanctioned the occurrence of nominalized verb-phrases and sentences. The actual semantics was furnished by the semantic domains of Scott's theory of computation. One issue of some importance was given scant attention in that presentation, namely, the role of a comprehension schema in the theory. In this paper we investigate this issue in some detail. Our more general objective is to examine the logical foundations of the enterprise in more depth than was possible in the earlier paper. In particular, we here provide a more general model-theoretic setting for the analysis of nominalization.

First, however, we must say a few words about the process of nominalization itself. In this paper we shall be exclusively concerned with nominalized predicates, and by the term 'nominalization' we shall mean any process which transforms a predicate or predicate phrase into a noun or noun phrase. For example, 'feminine' is transformed into 'femininity', 'divine' into 'divinity', and 'obscene' into 'obscenity'. Following Cocchiarella [8] I shall call these derivative nouns 'abstract singular terms'. Of course, the phenomenon of nominalization is not restricted to such instances of morphological nominalization. Consider the following pairs of sentences:

1. (a) The book is brown
   (b) *Brown* is a colour
2. (a) The cup is gold
   (b) *Gold* is an element
3. (a) Tammy and Toby are students
   (b) *Students* are numerous
4. (a) John is honest
   (b) *Honesty* is a hindrance

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