

Predication and Paronymous Modifiers

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'Innocence regained' is an oxymoron. Having known sin with truth-value assignments and computational, extensional valuations, semantic virginity is not something we can return to. But even so, it is not the fall from simplicity which constitutes semantic sin. Quite to the contrary, simplicity lies in the computational truth-value semantics of Frege and Tarski rather than in the semantic innocence of Russell.

Despite simplistic "correspondence theories of truth", true judgements and what makes them true are not in a simple 1-to-1 correspondence. Indeed, it is just this which makes the Russellian appeal to facts (situations, states of affairs) nontrivial. It is this which ensures that "*the slingshot*" ([2], pp. 24-26), since valid, must be viewed as a *reductio* of one or more of its (philosophically contentious) premises.

On the other hand, despite Frege, the powerful computational simplicity of standard truth-value semantics is philosophically insufficient. It fails to accommodate adequately our nested attributions of psychical states one to another. It effaces subtle but common distinctions that are based upon our discrete positionings of modifiers. It is insensitive to reasonable entailments projected from our truncated and too often inconsistent bodies of knowledge and belief.

After the age of innocence, an adult semantics must accommodate the complexities inherent in the common species of ordinary predication. The task, of course, is to do so in a thoroughly computational way. We consider next some of these types of predication, ones with some philosophical bite. It is not obvious how best to accommodate them within a fact-based semantics in a fully computational way.

1 *Predication and making true* What an assertion states and what makes the assertion true are often quite different things. This is not, I gather, a very controversial claim. Evidently, it is not true in general that two assertions made