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Reply to Burgess and to Read

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1 Introduction Either John is foaming at the mouth or John is biting the carpet. John is not foaming at the mouth. Therefore, John is biting the carpet. Such an instance of Disjunctive Syllogism (*DS*) is undoubtedly intuitive, but a form of inference which is intuitive is not thereby valid. There are (at least) three positions which can be taken concerning the validity of *DS*. *First: DS* is valid, and the "or" in it is the two-valued extensional "or". Thus, the argument form Extensional Disjunctive Syllogism (*EDS*), *i.e.*, $A \vee B$, $\sim A / \therefore B$, is valid. *Second: EDS* is invalid. There is a valid argument form, Intensional Disjunctive Syllogism (*IDS*), namely $A + B$, $\sim A / \therefore B$, where "+" is intensional disjunction. Whenever you have a valid example of *DS*, it is because it is an instance of *IDS*. *Third:* The examples of *DS* which seem intuitive are often instances of *EDS*; but this does not make *EDS* valid, and it is not. Whenever it seems intuitive to infer using *EDS*, it is because there is an extra assumption, that things are "normal", which ensures the truth of the conclusion and which explains the apparent intuitiveness of *EDS*.

Recently (in [8]), I defended the third of these. Read (in [9]) defended the second. In the course of my argument, I made the further claim that there are precise sufficient conditions for when the truth of the premises of *EDS* would ensure the truth of the conclusion and that these conditions obtained whenever there was an intuitive example of *EDS*. Both Read and Burgess ([4], see also his [5] and [6]) understood me to be trying to prove my claim by appeal to the validity of *EDS* in the metatheory, an appeal which they took to be circular. In Section 2 of this note, I will argue that there is no circularity in my position. In Section 3, I will argue that my position is a stable one, in that no collapse into a generally valid *EDS* follows from it. In Section 4, I will briefly respond to some of Burgess's other points from [4].

2 The appeal to normality We need some definitions. A theory for a logic L is a set of sentences closed under the consequence relation $\vdash_L$. It is useful to consider the situation we find ourselves in when deducing according to "natu-

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