

Book Review

Marian David. *Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth*.
 Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994. x + 206 pages.

1 The material of this book is divided into six chapters and a short appendix. Chapter 1 is an introduction. It consists of preliminary discussions of substantive and deflationary accounts of truth, correspondence and disquotation conceptions of truth, truth theory and its structure, and the bearers of truth. The second chapter is a survey of the main issues and tasks of a correspondence conception of truth. The third is a brief discussion of the main motivations for deflationism. The fourth is a detailed analysis of the thesis of disquotationalism and its appropriate formulation. The fifth, which is the longest chapter (about 80 pages), is an elaborate critique of disquotationalism. Chapter 6 is a two-page review of the book's central conclusion: disquotationalism fails because it has too many absurd consequences, and a correspondence conception of truth seems to be the only feasible alternative for someone who wishes to hold on to the basic intuition that 'Snow is white is true' if and only if snow is white. The appendix shows that the liar paradox is formalizable in a language whose truth predicate is defined disquotationally, and hence the liar and liar-like phenomena present similar challenges to both conceptions of truth, correspondence and disquotation.

David's book is really a critical essay on disquotationalism. It is very likely the most elaborate study of disquotationalism available in the philosophical literature to date. Out of the 188 pages that make the philosophical text of the book, 155 pages are almost entirely devoted to discussing disquotationalism. The one chapter allocated to the exposition of correspondence accounts of truth is included mostly for the sake of motivating disquotationalism. The latter, being a radically deflationist account of truth, is best seen when contrasted with the theory that it seeks to deflate.

2 Theories of truth are of two kinds, substantive and deflationary. Proponents of the first kind believe that the concept of truth has a deep nature that requires an ideologically sophisticated and ontologically rich philosophical account. Advocates of the

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