

Comment

David Freedman

Hodges has written a thoughtful and scholarly essay on the strengths and limitations of statistical models in policy analysis. Although there may be some differences in emphasis, his views are quite close to mine. I think the two main points are as follows:

(i) Models are usually chosen on the basis of familiarity and tractability; the degree of correspondence with reality is seldom of primary concern. Hodges' formulation:

"Certainly the range of possible model selections is strongly conditioned by the set of models the analyst's software can handle and by the analyst's desire or ability to spend time and money developing custom software. Models favored by readily available programs tend to allow only linear causal relationships, and random variables are usually members of exponential families. The dominant position of these models notwithstanding, they are little more than conventions: they have become conventional through constant exposition in service courses and textbooks, through availability in popular software packages, and because their mathematical tractability makes them inviting examples for scholars seeking to propagate new theory and methods."

(ii) Policy analysts usually assess only one component of the uncertainty in their results; in effect, they partial away uncertainty about structure. As Hodges dryly says,

"this creates an inherent tendency for analyses to understate uncertainty about predictions—about what is known—which can lead to invisible biases in policy considerations based on those analyses and can obscure the role of judgment and convention in the conclusions they produce."

These generalities aside, what really caught my attention in Hodges' paper (as may be only natural) was the sympathetic discussion of my own work. He quotes me—rightly—as saying that in many contexts, ad hoc analyses by experts may be better than modeling (write essays rather than fit models); recognition that some questions cannot be answered at all sensibly by the analysts within their contract performance period may be the wisest course of all.

Hodges then asks, "In what sense are the energy policy models that Freedman attacks *not* ad hoc expert

analyses, albeit elaborate ones?" This is a rhetorical question, but I'll respond to it. Models are often defended—not by Hodges—as being state of the art, objective, scientific exercises, with assumptions made explicit. By contrast, analytical essays informed by data are old fashioned, arbitrary, unscientific, with crucial premises left unstated.

Some may find this defense of models an attractive fantasy, but fantasy it is. My experience includes risk assessment and econometrics. (So I do not comment on the air force logistic models discussed by Hodges.) To make contemporary model-based policy analyses in Washington, the analyst has to introduce dozens if not hundreds of fairly arbitrary assumptions. Rather than being articulated and defended, these are buried in the statistical estimation procedures, or even deeper in the computer code.

Because first versions of models seldom give plausible results, the analyst has to massage inputs, outputs and model innards, until these are more or less in balance. Indeed, one well-known modeling group is famous for the "add factors" that must be applied to regression intercepts in order to get sensible-looking macroeconomic forecasts. Such Rube Goldberg contraptions are models by courtesy only.

Hodges' question implicitly acknowledges the arbitrariness of current policy models and their weakness as formal arguments. He seems to be asking whether I would be more sympathetic to the models if they were relabeled as informal argument. The answer is, a little.

Computer code often functions as a decent veil of technical obscurity covering up some basic silliness. Articulating models in English rather than FORTRAN tends to make their problems—the multiplicity of arbitrary and unreasonable assumptions—more visible. That is why the code was there in the first place.

In summary, essays can be more objective, scientific and explicit than computer models. Consider, for example, the debate on capital punishment. Hodges cites (not approvingly) the model in Ehrlich (1975); for a devastating critique of such models, see Leamer (1983). By contrast, Zeisel (1981) is a fascinating and persuasive essay based on data. For more general discussions of modeling issues see Freedman (1987), Freedman and Zeisel (1987), Kolata (1986) and National Academy of Sciences (1984).

Continuing his review of my position. Hodges also asks, "how should data and data reduction techniques be used to inform all these judgments?" Then his

David Freedman is Professor of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720.