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## Comment

## Herbert H. Clark

In the last few years, Mosteller, Youtz and their colleagues have looked at probability and frequency expressions such as usual, very likely, improbable, frequent and as often as not. Their interest is in how these terms are used in communicating technical in-

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formation, and their goal is to better that communication, to make it more precise. Their project has two phases. In the first, they will determine what these terms mean to the people who use them. In their own study they have found, for example, that *frequent* is judged to represent an average proportion of about 0.72 of the time with an interquartile range of about 0.15. If you say something is frequent, they claim, you are saying that it occurs about 72% of the time plus