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This is one in a series of fascinating papers. They are easily read as painting a picture of modern Bayesianism in bad trouble but frequentism in fine shape. A larger historical perspective gives a different view, however. It should therefore be sketched, even if only impressionistically.

Time began in darkness and "inverse" probability. Then the Rev. Thomas Bayes let in some posthumous light. The postulate he identified and used was duly found arbitrary or ambiguous, and unfounded. Likewise Fisher's reference sets. Then Neyman and Pearson developed "objective" (frequentist) concepts even as Ramsey and de Finetti were proving that "subjective" Bayesianism was the only coherent theory possible. Soon (well before Pratt's 1961 and 1965 surveys) objective methods too were found arbitrary and theoretically and practically deficient even in the simplest situations (where uniformly most powerful tests are randomized).