

yet be the seed from which grows a useful method for comparing and evaluating forecasters. One step in this direction has been taken by Rubin (1984), but more work is needed.

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REJOINDER

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Mark Schervish musters some convincing arguments and examples to back up his position, outlined in my final paragraph, that the mathematics I have developed cannot be regarded as establishing the concept of empirical probability on a firm footing. All in all, I am in agreement with him. The essentially asymptotic nature of any criteria for empirical validity of probability assignments must mean, quite simply, that these can never be applied to finite experience in anything other than a nonrigorous and suggestive way. (The half-baked suggestions of my Section 13.4 clearly attest to this.)

This consideration applies just as much to traditional frequency-based interpretations of probability as to my attempted extension. Indeed, I have considered elsewhere (Dawid, 1985c) some of the logical difficulties that dog attempts to understand the probability assignments of the Bernoulli model in terms of limiting relative frequencies, and reached conclusions similar to Schervish's, arguing that an entirely subjective approach to the relationship between prob-