The Annals of Statistics
- Ann. Statist.
- Volume 4, Number 6 (1976), 1236-1239.
Agreeing to Disagree
Abstract
Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event $E$ if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event $A$ are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.
Article information
Source
Ann. Statist. Volume 4, Number 6 (1976), 1236-1239.
Dates
First available in Project Euclid: 12 April 2007
Permanent link to this document
https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176343654
Digital Object Identifier
doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654
Mathematical Reviews number (MathSciNet)
MR433654
Zentralblatt MATH identifier
0379.62003
JSTOR
links.jstor.org
Subjects
Primary: 62A15
Secondary: 62C05: General considerations 90A05 90D35
Keywords
Information subjective probability posterior statistics game theory revising probabilities concensus Harsanyi doctrine
Citation
Aumann, Robert J. Agreeing to Disagree. Ann. Statist. 4 (1976), no. 6, 1236--1239. doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654. https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aos/1176343654.
